Cosgrove Law previously blogged on the topic of U-5 defamation. We noted that broker-dealers that are members of the FINRA are
required to file a Form U-5 when terminating their relationship with
a registered representative. Broker-dealers must also describe
the specific reason(s) that the rep was discharged or permitted to
resign. If the reasons disclosed on
the U-5 were false, exaggerated or misleading, the firm can be subject to a claim for defamation.
One defense frequently raised by defendant broker-dealers is that the statements made on the form U-5 are subject to an "absolute privilege." This means that a broker-dealer cannot be held liable for defamation for anything it puts on the U-5, even if it knows the statements were false or misleading. If that defense is unavailable, a broker-dealer will argue that the statements are subject to a "qualified privilege." A qualified privilege is usually revoked by proof of malice or by a showing of reckless disregard as to the truth of the statements. Frequently, the falsity of the statements could arguably show the malice required to revoke whatever privilege the U–5 might enjoy.
Unfortunately for the broker-dealers raising the absolute privilege defense, it is rarely available. State law, not federal law, determines whether an absolute privilege applies. So far, only the state of New York has adopted the absolute privilege standard. Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007) (finding that statements made by employer on form U-5 are subject to absolute privilege
in suit for defamation).
In fact, many states have explicitly rejected the absolute privilege defense or have found that only the qualified privilege applies. See
Dawson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1163-64
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that reports of customer complaints on Form
U-5 are not protected by absolute privilege under Illinois law);
Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 136-37 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that statements on Form U-5 are not entitled to absolute privilege under Tennessee law); Moreland v. Perkins, Smart & Boyd
240 P.3d 601, 609 (Kan.App. 2010) (rejecting absolute privilege and holding that the statements in the Form U–5 were entitled to a
qualified privilege at most, both under case law and under Kansas statutory law); Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
431 F.Supp.2d 247, 261-62 (D.Conn. 2006) (finding that statements made on form U-5
were not subject to absolute
privilege from defamation liability under Connecticut law, but were instead subject to qualified privilege); Boxdorfer v. Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, No.
1:09-cv-0109-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 2448459, *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 10, 2009)
(noting that statements on the Form U-5 are entitled to a qualified privilege under
Indiana law); Wietecha v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., No. CIV 05-0324-PHX-SMM,
2006 WL 2772838, *11 (D.Ariz. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding that Arizona law comports with the application
of a qualified privilege to statements published in the U-4 and U-5 Forms).
If you are a registered representative and feel you
have been harmed by false or misleading statements published on your
Form U-5 or to third parties, Cosgrove Law, LLC has substantive
experience representing reps and advisers in such matters.
Friday, May 25, 2012
The Privilege Defense to U-5 Defamation Claims
Posted by Kurt J. Schafers at 1:08 PM 0 comments
Labels: Defamation, FINRA
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
SEC Takes a Closer Look at Real Estate Investment Trusts
A Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”) is generally a company
that owns income producing real estate. To qualify as a REIT, a
company must have the majority of its assets and income connected to
real estate investments and must annually distribute at least 90
percent of its taxable income to shareholders in the form of
dividends. To review additional qualifications of a REIT, See
SEC - REIT
Information.
If you have suffered losses as a result of purchasing non-traded REITs, contact us to discuss your legal rights.
Posted by Mary E. Hodges at 4:23 PM 0 comments
Labels: disclosure, FINRA, Fraud, real estate, REIT, SEC, valuation
Thursday, May 10, 2012
FINRA Bars Pinnacle Partner Financial Corp. and its President Over Allegedly Fraudulent Sales
FINRA also alleges that from around January 2009 through March 2011, Alfaro used customer funds: “(1) to meet obligations for previous offerings; (2) cover Alfaro’s personal expenses; and (3) make cash payments to Alfaro personally.” See FINRA Order
The disciplinary proceedings began on November 23, 2010. Alfaro and Pinnacle subsequently entered in Temporary Cease and Desist Consent Orders (“TCDO”). Approximately two months after entering into the TCDO, Alfaro and Pinnacle allegedly violated the orders and were suspended from FINRA on March 8, 2011. The hearing was scheduled for February 27, 2012 but Alfaro informed his counsel that he would not be attending the hearing and planned on defaulting. As a result, Pinnacle and Alfaro were expelled from FINRA.
Posted by Mary E. Hodges at 10:30 AM 0 comments
Labels: default judgment, expelled, FINRA, Fraud, Pinnacle Partners, rescission