Cosgrove Law previously blogged on the topic of U-5 defamation. We noted that broker-dealers that are members of the FINRA are
required to file a Form U-5 when terminating their relationship with
a registered representative. Broker-dealers must also describe
the specific reason(s) that the rep was discharged or permitted to
resign. If the reasons disclosed on
the U-5 were false, exaggerated or misleading, the firm can be subject to a claim for defamation.
One defense frequently raised by defendant broker-dealers is that the statements made on the form U-5 are subject to an "absolute privilege." This means that a broker-dealer cannot be held liable for defamation for anything it puts on the U-5, even if it knows the statements were false or misleading. If that defense is unavailable, a broker-dealer will argue that the statements are subject to a "qualified privilege." A qualified privilege is usually revoked by proof of malice or by a showing of reckless disregard as to the truth of the statements. Frequently, the falsity of the statements could arguably show the malice required to revoke whatever privilege the U–5 might enjoy.
Unfortunately for the broker-dealers raising the absolute privilege defense, it is rarely available. State law, not federal law, determines whether an absolute privilege applies. So far, only the state of New York has adopted the absolute privilege standard. Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007) (finding that statements made by employer on form U-5 are subject to absolute privilege
in suit for defamation).
In fact, many states have explicitly rejected the absolute privilege defense or have found that only the qualified privilege applies. See
Dawson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1163-64
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that reports of customer complaints on Form
U-5 are not protected by absolute privilege under Illinois law);
Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 136-37 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that statements on Form U-5 are not entitled to absolute privilege under Tennessee law); Moreland v. Perkins, Smart & Boyd
240 P.3d 601, 609 (Kan.App. 2010) (rejecting absolute privilege and holding that the statements in the Form U–5 were entitled to a
qualified privilege at most, both under case law and under Kansas statutory law); Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
431 F.Supp.2d 247, 261-62 (D.Conn. 2006) (finding that statements made on form U-5
were not subject to absolute
privilege from defamation liability under Connecticut law, but were instead subject to qualified privilege); Boxdorfer v. Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, No.
1:09-cv-0109-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 2448459, *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 10, 2009)
(noting that statements on the Form U-5 are entitled to a qualified privilege under
Indiana law); Wietecha v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., No. CIV 05-0324-PHX-SMM,
2006 WL 2772838, *11 (D.Ariz. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding that Arizona law comports with the application
of a qualified privilege to statements published in the U-4 and U-5 Forms).
If you are a registered representative and feel you
have been harmed by false or misleading statements published on your
Form U-5 or to third parties, Cosgrove Law, LLC has substantive
experience representing reps and advisers in such matters.
News and commentary on the latest securities developments. The information on this Blog is prepared by Cosgrove Simpson for informational purposes only and is not intended to and does not constitute legal advice.
Friday, May 25, 2012
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
SEC Takes a Closer Look at Real Estate Investment Trusts
A Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”) is generally a company that owns income producing real estate. To qualify as a REIT, a company must have the majority of its assets and income connected to real estate investments and must annually distribute at least 90 percent of its taxable income to shareholders in the form of dividends. To review additional qualifications of a REIT, See SEC - REIT Information.
REITs have really come under intensifying scrutiny by
securities regulators since many non-traded REITs have been forced to
cut their estimated value and have ceased making distributions.
Furthermore, many of these REITs have attracted retirees as investors
by promising steady and dependable distributions. For example,
the SEC has recently taken interest in the activities of Inland
American Real Estate Trust to determine if it committed violations
relating to management fees, the timing and amount of distributions
paid to investors, determination of property impairments and
transactions with affiliates. The investigation was announced
by Inland last week in its quarterly report. Executives from
Inland have stated that they intend to fully cooperate with any
investigation and that they do not believe it has committed any
violations.
Inland holds around $11.2 billion in property,
including retail hotels, offices, industrial buildings and apartment
complexes. It is the largest REIT in an industry of around 90
non-traded REITs.
FINRA has recently proposed new guidelines on adviser
disclosure of REITs. See FINRA
Regulatory Notice. Furthermore, the SEC has been
pressing non-traded REITs to provide better disclosure on their share
valuations because these valuations can vary due to some REITs
relying on outside appraisals and others relying on their own
management. For instance, FINRA sued David Lerner Associates
Inc., last year, alleging that the Apple REIT seller “unreasonably
valued their shares at a constant price of $11, notwithstanding
market fluctuations, performance declines and increased leverage.”
The case is still pending.
In June, 2011, another REIT, Retail Properties of
America Inc., estimated its value at $6.95 per share. However,
in its initial public offering last month, the shares were listed at
$3.20 per share.
REITs, however, may be appropriate for the savvy and experienced investor, particularly since many REITs have been investing in the global market. Several U.S. REITs that have invested abroad believe the future is promising. For instance, New York and Toronto based Brookfield Office Properties entered into its first London deal on a development site known as 100 Bishopgate. Many of these investments are good for the patient investor because income is usually not realized until further down the road.
If you have suffered losses as a result of purchasing non-traded REITs, contact us to discuss your legal rights.
If you have suffered losses as a result of purchasing non-traded REITs, contact us to discuss your legal rights.
Labels:
disclosure,
FINRA,
Fraud,
real estate,
REIT,
SEC,
valuation
Thursday, May 10, 2012
FINRA Bars Pinnacle Partner Financial Corp. and its President Over Allegedly Fraudulent Sales
On April 25, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”) expelled broker-dealer Pinnacle Partners Financial
Corp. and its president, Brian Alfaro, from membership after they
failed to respond to allegations that they made fraudulent sales
involving oil and gas private placements and unregistered securities
in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In addition to expulsion, Pinnacle and Alfaro also were ordered
to offer rescission to investors who were sold fraudulent offerings,
and to refund all sales commissions to those who do not request
rescission. See FINRA
Order
FINRA also alleges that from around January 2009 through March 2011, Alfaro used customer funds: “(1) to meet obligations for previous offerings; (2) cover Alfaro’s personal expenses; and (3) make cash payments to Alfaro personally.” See FINRA Order
The disciplinary proceedings began on November 23, 2010. Alfaro and Pinnacle subsequently entered in Temporary Cease and Desist Consent Orders (“TCDO”). Approximately two months after entering into the TCDO, Alfaro and Pinnacle allegedly violated the orders and were suspended from FINRA on March 8, 2011. The hearing was scheduled for February 27, 2012 but Alfaro informed his counsel that he would not be attending the hearing and planned on defaulting. As a result, Pinnacle and Alfaro were expelled from FINRA.
Labels:
default judgment,
expelled,
FINRA,
Fraud,
Pinnacle Partners,
rescission
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
Has the SEC Stepped Up to the Plate on Fraud Enforcement Actions?
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” The SEC believes that its “investor protection mission is more compelling than ever” since more first-time investors have turned to the market to invest in their future. Therefore, it goes without saying that the SEC’s enforcement authority is crucial in maintaining investor protection. But, has the SEC stepped up to the plate considering the negative impact the 2008 financial crisis has had on investors?
The 2008 financial crisis had devastating effects on our economy which caused massive job losses and a growing number of American families at risk of foreclosure and poverty. However, some companies made substantial profits from the financial collapse and many top executives received considerable bonuses (some from government bailout money) after millions of families’ investments dwindled or even disappeared.
Most recently, the SEC filed civil fraud charges in Texas against former Chief Executive Anthony Nocella and former Chief Financial Officer J. Russell McCann of Franklin Bank Corp. for concealing the deterioration of the bank’s finances during the mortgage crisis. Specifically, the SEC alleged that in 2007, Nocella and Man used aggressive loan modification programs to hide the bank’s non-performing loans and artificially boost profits. See SEC Complaint.
Despite having charged over 100 people and firms with fraud tied to the financial crisis, critics of the SEC believe the agency hasn’t buckled down hard enough. Yet SEC enforcement chief, Robert Khuzami, believe these numbers show the agencies effectiveness in “tackling financial-crisis wrong-doing.” Of the 74 cases filed against individuals, 55 are chief executives, finance chiefs or other top officers. Khuzami believes this “sends a strong deterrent message.”
Many of the SEC critics note that about 24 of the people charged by the SEC have avoided trial by reaching “weak” settlements. Senator Grassley from Iowa stated, “The lack of accountability from Wall Street encourages recidivism.”
For instance, Angelo Mozilo, Chief Executive of Countrywide Financial Corp., agreed to a settlement of $67.5 million ($22.5 million penalty and $45 million disgorgement), while denying any wrongdoing. These sanctions are supposed to compensate investors for their losses. However, the repayment of illegal profits is tax-deductible and can be covered by some corporate insurance policies. In Mozilo’s case, nearly half of the $45 million payment came from Countrywide's current owner, Bank of America Corp. It can be difficult for the SEC to challenge indemnification rights in employment contracts or insurance policies.
According to The Wall Street Journal, in the 24 crisis-related cases where the SEC reached a settlement with an individual, the median sanction was $203,751. These same defendants paid a combined $80.7 million in penalties. Most of those penalties came from executives at collapsed mortgage lenders such Countrywide, American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. and New Century Financial Corp.; yet, their investors sustained losses of about $31 billion based on the three companies' peak stock-market value before the financial crisis began. These penalties arguably pale in comparison to investor losses.
Even some federal judges have criticized the large gaps between investor losses and the penalty. For example, U.S. District Judge Frederic Block in New York, said $1.05 million in penalties paid by two former Bear Stearns Cos. hedge-fund managers, Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, in a proposed settlement of civil-fraud charges against them was “chump change” compared with the $1.8 billion lost by investors. The judge has not yet approved the proposed settlement.
While to some, the above penalties may seem like an inadequate punishment for the charges, Cioffi and Tannin have agreed to a temporary ban from the securities industry. Khuzami believes the SEC’s power to expel people from the securities industry or from serving as directors of public companies is “probably one of the most powerful sanctions [it has].”
Furthermore, when reaching settlements, the SEC has to weigh the likelihood of losing to a jury, along with the amount the agency can show was a direct result of the wrongdoing. In some cases, it can be hard to say with certainty how much of investor losses were caused by fraud or illegal conduct, or if any fraud or illegal conduct actually took place. Usually, defendants argue the financial losses were due to a failure to predict the meltdown, rather than any fraud on their part. The answer is not always clear cut and pushing for stricter penalties across the board may not be appropriate for each case.
Nevertheless, we can only hope that Americans’ trust in our banking and financial systems can once again be restored.
Labels:
2008 financial crisis,
complaint,
enforcement,
Fraud,
indemnification,
investors,
penalties,
SEC
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Finra Sends Out a Busy Signal to Telemarketing
The
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“Finra”) recently
announced the approval of new Finra Rule 3230 by the U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission (“SEC”), thereby replacing NASD Rule
2212. Finra Rule 3230 speaks directly to the telemarketing
activities of Finra member firms and their associated persons and has
an effective date of June 29, 2012.
Finra
Rule 3230
NASD
Rule 2212, NYSE Rule 440A and NYSE Rule Interpretation 440A/01 were
all invalidated by the SEC’s approval of Rule 3230. That said,
however, the new rule does adopt certain provisions of NYSE Rule 440A
and its Interpretation and is substantively similar in context to FTC
rules and regulations dealing with telemarketing activities and other
such deceptive and abusive practices.
FinraRule 3230 contains several components, each of which is highlighted
below.
- General Telemarketing Requirements
Rule
3230 states that no Finra member firm or associated person of a
member firm may initiate an outbound telephone call to any personal
residence prior to 8:00am or after 9:00pm local time at the location
of the called individual. However, such a call is permissible if the
member firm meets one of the following exceptions:
- The member has an established business relationship with the person being called;
- The member has received the person’s prior permission or invitation; or,
- The person phoned is a broker or dealer.
If
one of the defined exceptions is not met, such a call would be deemed
a rule violation.
In
addition, no member firm or associated person may make an outbound
telephone call to a person whom has previously requested to not be
contacted by the member firm or who has registered his/her telephone
number with the FTC national Do-Not-Call Registry.
- Do-Not-Call Registry
The
rule states that a member firm telemarketing calls will not be held
to have committed a violation of 3230(a)(3) by phoning a person on a
phone number registered with the national Do-Not-Call Registry if:
- The member has an established business relationship with the recipient of such a call (It should be noted, a request to be placed on the firm’s Do-Not-Call list ceases the business relationship, even if the person continues to conduct business with the firm.);
- The member has obtained the prior express written consent of the recipient to receive such a call; or,
- The associated person placing the call has a personal relationship with the recipient of the call.
- Safe Harbor Provision
A
member firm or associated person of a member will be deemed to not be
liable of violating 3230(a)(3) if the member can demonstrate that
such violation is the result of an error and that the member meets
the following benchmarks:
- The member has established and implemented written procedures to comply will the rules and requirements of the national Do-Not-Call registry;
- The member has trained its personnel and any 3rd parties assisting with the member’s compliance on the member’s procedures established pursuant to the national Do-Not-Call registry;
- The member has maintained and recorded a listing of all telephone numbers which it may not contact; and,
- The member utilizes a process or procedure whereby it seeks to prevent any outbound telephone call to any telephone number on any Do-Not-Call registry, using a version of the national Do-Not-Call registry obtained from the administrator of the registry not more than 31 days prior to the date any such call is made, and the member maintains records documenting such a process.
- Procedures
Prior
to employing telemarketing activities, a member firm must first
develop and establish procedures to comply with Rule 3230. Such
procedures must, at a minimum, satisfy the following:
- Members must have a written policy for the maintenance of a Do-Not-Call registry.
- Personnel of a member that engage in telemarketing activities must be informed of and trained on the use of such a Do-Not-Call registry.
- A member who receives a request from a person not to receive calls from that member must record the request and place the person's name, if provided, and telephone number on the firm's Do-Not-Call registry at the time the request received. Members must honor such a request within a reasonable time, not to exceed 30-days from the date the request is made. A member will be held liable for the failure to honor such a request, even if such requests are recorded or maintained by a 3rd party placing calls on behalf of a member.
- A member or associated person of a member making an outbound telephone call must provide the call recipient with the name of the individual caller, the name of the member, an address or telephone number at which the member may be contacted, and inform the recipient that the purpose of the call is to solicit the purchase of securities or related services. In addition, the telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any other number for which charges exceed local or long distance transmission charges.
- Unless specifically requested to the contrary, a person's do-not-call request shall apply to the member making the call and will not apply to any affiliated entities unless the consumer reasonably would expect such affiliated entities to be included given the identification of the caller and the product being advertised.
- Wireless Communications
All
provisions of the rule shall also apply to calls made by the member
and its associated persons to wireless telephone numbers.
- Outsourcing Telemarketing
A
member shall still remain accountable for certifying compliance with
the provisions of the rule, even if it should outsource some or all
of its telemarketing services to an outside party.
- Called ID Information
Any
member that engages in telemarketing activities must ensure that the
telephone numbers used and, where available, the name of the member
is appropriately displayed on any caller ID devices utilized by the
recipient of an outbound call. Such a telephone number provided must
be available during normal business hours for a recipient of such a
call to make a Do-Not-Call request.
- Unencrypted Consumer Account Numbers
No
member or associated person shall disclose or receive, for
consideration, unencrypted consumer account numbers for use in the
member’s telemarketing activities. The term “unencrypted”
shall mean not only complete, visible account numbers, but also
encrypted information with a key to its decryption.
- Submission of Billing Information
For
any telemarketing transaction, a member or its associated person must
obtain the express consent of the person to be charged.
In
any telemarketing transaction involving preacquired account
information and a free-to-pay conversion feature, the member must:
- Obtain from the customer, at a minimum, the last four digits of the account number to be charged;
- Obtain from the customer an express agreement to be charged; and,
- Make and maintain an audio recording of the entire telemarketing transaction.
In
any other telemarketing transaction involving preacquired account
information not described above, the member must:
- Identify the account to be charged with sufficient specificity for the customer to understand what account will be charged; and,
- Obtain from the customer an express agreement to be charged and to be charged using the account number identified.
- Abandoned Calls
No
member shall “abandon” any outbound telemarketing call. An
outbound call is considered to be “abandoned” if a person answers
it and the call is not connected to a person associated with a member
within two seconds of the person's completed greeting.
A
member shall not be liable for violating this provision of the rule
if:
- The member employs technology that ensures abandonment of no more than three percent of all telemarketing calls answered by a person, measured over the duration of a single calling campaign, if less than 30 days, or separately over each successive 30-day period or portion thereof that the campaign continues;
- The member allows the telephone to ring for at least 15 seconds or four rings before disconnecting an unanswered call;
- Whenever a person associated with a member is not available to speak with the person answering the telemarketing call within two seconds after the person's completed greeting, the member plays a recorded message that states the name and telephone number of the member or person associated with the member on whose behalf the call was placed; and,
- The member retains records establishing compliance with this provision of the rule.
- Pre-recorded Messages
No
member shall initiate an outbound telemarketing call that delivers a
prerecorded message other than a prerecorded message permitted for
compliance with the call abandonment safe harbor unless:
- The member has obtained from the recipient of the call an express written agreement that:
- The member obtained only after a clear and conspicuous disclosure that the purpose of the agreement is to authorize the member to place prerecorded calls to such person;
- The member obtained without requiring, directly or indirectly, that the agreement be executed as a condition of opening an account or purchasing any good or service;
- Evidences the willingness of the recipient of the call to receive calls that deliver prerecorded messages by or on behalf of the member or its associated persons; and,
- Includes such person's telephone number and signature (which may be obtained electronically under the E-Sign Act);
- The member allows the telephone to ring for at least 15 seconds or four rings before disconnecting an unanswered call; and within two seconds after the completed greeting of the person called, plays a prerecorded message that promptly provides the disclosures above, followed immediately by a disclosure of one or both of the following:
- For a call that could be answered by a person, that the person called can use an automated interactive voice and/or keypress-activated opt-out mechanism to assert a do-not-call request at any time during the message. Such a mechanism must:
- automatically add the number called to the member's Do-Not-Call registry;
- Once invoked, immediately disconnect the call; and,
- Be available for use at any time during the message.
- For a call that could be answered by an answering machine or voicemail service, that the person called can use a toll-free telephone number to assert a do-not-call request. The number provided must connect directly to an automated interactive voice or keypress-activated opt-out mechanism that:
- Automatically adds the number called to the member's Do-Not-Call registry;
- Immediately thereafter disconnects the call; and,
- Is accessible at any time throughout the duration of the telemarketing campaign; and,
- The member complies with all other requirements of Rule 3230 and other applicable federal and state laws.
- Credit Card Laundering
Except
as expressly permitted by the applicable credit card system, no
member or person associated with a member shall:
- Present for payment, a credit card sales draft generated by a telemarketing transaction that is not the result of a telemarketing credit card transaction between the cardholder and the member;
- Employ, solicit, or otherwise cause a merchant, or an employee, representative or agent of the merchant, to present for payment, a credit card sales draft generated by a telemarketing transaction that is not the result of a telemarketing credit card transaction between the cardholder and the merchant; or,
- Obtain access to the credit card system through the use of a business relationship or an affiliation with a merchant, when such access is not authorized by the merchant agreement or the applicable credit card system.
- Definitions
Finra
Rule 3230 adopts definitions that are substantially similar to the
FTC’s
definitions.
Supplementary
Material
Rule
3230 also includes as Supplementary Material a provision that is
similar to NYSE Rule Interpretation 440A/01 and which reminds members
that the rule does not affect the obligation of any member or its
associated person that engages in telemarketing to comply with
relevant state and federal laws and rules.
_____
Cosgrove Law, LLC welcomes guest blogger Jeffery Barton. Mr. Barton is able to offer a variety of compliance consulting services which can be used as an extension of the compliance services offered by Cosgrove Law, LLC.
_____
Cosgrove Law, LLC welcomes guest blogger Jeffery Barton. Mr. Barton is able to offer a variety of compliance consulting services which can be used as an extension of the compliance services offered by Cosgrove Law, LLC.
Labels:
Compliance,
FINRA,
Jeffrey Barton,
telemarketing
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
In the Wake of Facebook’s IPO, Several Firms are Accused of Securities Fraud
The SEC and FINRA have responded to the increased
popularity in owning private shares of major technology companies
such as Facebook and Twitter by stepping up enforcement of the
pre-IPO market.
The SEC recently charged Frank Mazzola and his two
private investment funds (Felix Investments, LLC and Facie Libre
Management Associates, LLC) with securities fraud. The
funds were established solely to acquire shares in Facebook and other
tech firms with securities fraud. The SEC has alleged that
these firms misled investors and pocketed undisclosed fees and secret
commissions.
While fund managers are required to fully disclose
material conflicts of interest and their compensation, Mazzola and
his firms allegedly failed to do so. Mazzola, Felix, and Facie
Libre also earned commissions above and beyond the 5% commission that
was disclosed in offering materials during the acquisition of
Facebook stock. To make matters worse, Mazzola and his firms
allegedly mislead investors into believing Felix and Facie Libre had
ownership in stock of certain tech companies such as Facebook and
Zynga, and made false statements which inflated the revenue of
Twitter to attract investors. According to the SEC and FINRA,
Mazzola improperly raised over $70 million from investors using such
deceitful tactics.
The SEC complaint against Mazzola, Felix, and Facie
Libre request that they be permanently enjoined from violating the
various securities laws and to disgorge any and all wrongfully
obtained benefits.
It is important for investors to use caution and
diligence when investing in pre-IPO stocks because they typically
lack the type of public disclosures that are required for public
stock. If you have been a victim of broker fraud or negligence
the attorneys at Cosgrove Law, LLC may be able to help you recover
your losses.
Labels:
enforcement,
facebook,
FINRA,
Mazzola,
pre-IPO market,
SEC,
secret commissions,
securities fraud
Sunday, March 25, 2012
Manifest Disregard of the Facts: A Valid Basis to Vacate an Arbitration Award?
Motions to vacate arbitration awards are becoming more and more common. For example, as noted in the Wall Street Journal, state and federal courts issued 141 written decisions on motions to vacate arbitration awards in 2005. In 2010, the number was 208, a 48% increase from 2005.
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") sets forth the statutory grounds to vacate an arbitration award; namely: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where an arbitrator evidenced partiality or corruption; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; and (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their power. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4). In Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e now hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”
"Manifest distregard of the law" is a judicially created exception to the exclusivity of the grounds for vacatur set forth in the FAA. An arbitration panel acts with manifest disregard if (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators consciously refused to heed that legal principle. However, there is currently a circuit split as to whether Hall Street abrogated this judicially created doctrine.
A party disappointed with the decision of the arbitrator(s) will likely argue that the arbitrators acted with "manifest disregard of the law," and may also try to argue that the decision is in "manifest distregard of the facts." However, the "manifest disregard of the facts" argument is almost certainly destined to fail.
“Insufficient evidence or even wholesale disregard of evidence by an arbitrator is not a sufficient basis for a court to vacate an award.” Williams v. Mexican Restaurant, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-841, 2009 WL 531859, *5 (E.D. Tex. February 27, 2009) (citing Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that “manifest disregard of the evidence” is not a proper ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award); see also Fairchild Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 510 F.Supp.2d 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that “[m]anifest disregard of evidence is also not a proper ground justifying vacating an arbitrator’s award.”); Smith v. Rush Retail Centers, Inc., 291 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.Tex. 2003) (“[T]o the extent plaintiff is merely alleging that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard of the facts, the allegation is not a basis for vacating the award[.]”); ABS Brokerage Services, LLC v. Penson Financial Services, Inc., Civ. No. 09–4590 (DRD), 2010 WL 2723173 at *7 (D.N.J. July 8, 2010) (stating that plaintiffs’ arguments that the arbitrators exceeded their power by acting in “manifest disregard” of the facts were, in essence, an invitation for court to review the arbitrators’ factual determinations, which the court is prohibited from doing); Buechner v. Mid-America Energy, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-109, 2007 WL 2174723, at *4 (W.D.Ky. Aug. 2, 2007) (“To the extent that Respondents seek for this Court to review the arbitrator’s determination of the facts based on proof presented by the Petitioners, the Court cannot; such considerations exceed the scope of the Court’s review.”).
For example, in Mays v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1346 (M.D.Ala. 2000), the plaintiff asserted that, because the arbitrator “totally ignore[d] much favorable evidence,” the award must be vacated under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). In other words, plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed his powers because the arbitrator disregarded plaintiff’s evidence. The court stated that it could locate no case authority establishing that an arbitrator’s disregard of alleged “much favorable evidence” was a ground for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Id. The court found that, rather than asserting a proper basis for vacating the arbitration award, plaintiff's arguments were “nothing more than thinly veiled attempts to obtain appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision, which is not permitted under the FAA.” Id. at 1347 (citing Gingiss Intern., Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In sum, while an argument that the arbitrator(s) acted in "manifest disregard of the law" may have traction in some judicial circuits, the "manifest disregard of the facts" argument will likely fail to gain recognition in any judicial circuit.
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") sets forth the statutory grounds to vacate an arbitration award; namely: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where an arbitrator evidenced partiality or corruption; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; and (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their power. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4). In Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e now hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”
"Manifest distregard of the law" is a judicially created exception to the exclusivity of the grounds for vacatur set forth in the FAA. An arbitration panel acts with manifest disregard if (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators consciously refused to heed that legal principle. However, there is currently a circuit split as to whether Hall Street abrogated this judicially created doctrine.
A party disappointed with the decision of the arbitrator(s) will likely argue that the arbitrators acted with "manifest disregard of the law," and may also try to argue that the decision is in "manifest distregard of the facts." However, the "manifest disregard of the facts" argument is almost certainly destined to fail.
“Insufficient evidence or even wholesale disregard of evidence by an arbitrator is not a sufficient basis for a court to vacate an award.” Williams v. Mexican Restaurant, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-841, 2009 WL 531859, *5 (E.D. Tex. February 27, 2009) (citing Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that “manifest disregard of the evidence” is not a proper ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award); see also Fairchild Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 510 F.Supp.2d 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that “[m]anifest disregard of evidence is also not a proper ground justifying vacating an arbitrator’s award.”); Smith v. Rush Retail Centers, Inc., 291 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.Tex. 2003) (“[T]o the extent plaintiff is merely alleging that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard of the facts, the allegation is not a basis for vacating the award[.]”); ABS Brokerage Services, LLC v. Penson Financial Services, Inc., Civ. No. 09–4590 (DRD), 2010 WL 2723173 at *7 (D.N.J. July 8, 2010) (stating that plaintiffs’ arguments that the arbitrators exceeded their power by acting in “manifest disregard” of the facts were, in essence, an invitation for court to review the arbitrators’ factual determinations, which the court is prohibited from doing); Buechner v. Mid-America Energy, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-109, 2007 WL 2174723, at *4 (W.D.Ky. Aug. 2, 2007) (“To the extent that Respondents seek for this Court to review the arbitrator’s determination of the facts based on proof presented by the Petitioners, the Court cannot; such considerations exceed the scope of the Court’s review.”).
For example, in Mays v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1346 (M.D.Ala. 2000), the plaintiff asserted that, because the arbitrator “totally ignore[d] much favorable evidence,” the award must be vacated under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). In other words, plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed his powers because the arbitrator disregarded plaintiff’s evidence. The court stated that it could locate no case authority establishing that an arbitrator’s disregard of alleged “much favorable evidence” was a ground for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Id. The court found that, rather than asserting a proper basis for vacating the arbitration award, plaintiff's arguments were “nothing more than thinly veiled attempts to obtain appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision, which is not permitted under the FAA.” Id. at 1347 (citing Gingiss Intern., Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In sum, while an argument that the arbitrator(s) acted in "manifest disregard of the law" may have traction in some judicial circuits, the "manifest disregard of the facts" argument will likely fail to gain recognition in any judicial circuit.
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