Conflict Management for Terminated Financial Advisors

There is plenty of room for conflict when a financial advisor is leaving his or her broker-dealer. Although the departure may start off in an amicable fashion, tensions often flare once promissory notes and client retention issues arise. Moreover, an involuntary or “for-cause” termination may implicate defamation and regulatory issues. In other words, your broker-dealer may defame you on your U-5/U-4[1] providing you with an arbitration claim but also subjecting you to months of regulatory scrutiny from FINRA and state regulators. So here is my lecture: it is wise to retain independent counsel as soon as you are even contemplating leaving your current broker-dealer. Your legal counsel can help you achieve a smooth transition or at least advocate for you during the termination process. Our firm has represented countless departing brokers on a nearly endless array of issues. We have also recouped millions of dollars in defamations awards and settlements. Food for thought.

Please follow us on Twitter @CosLawGroup, on LinkedIn at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC, and on Facebook at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC.  

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[1] In 2020, U5 defamation cases were the fourth most common intra-industry claim filed with FINRA, behind breach of contract, promissory notes, and compensation claims. (https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/form-u5-defamation-claims-rise-finra-be-prepared)

U-5 Filings and the Compelled Self-published Defamation Doctrine

 

Last year, the California Court of Appeals issued a highly instructive opinion in the area of U-5 defamation. Some excerpts from that opinion will help us get started on a variety of blogs. The case is Tilkey v Allstate Insurance Company.

INTRODUCTION

While Michael Tilkey and his girlfriend Jacqueline Mann were visiting at her home, the two got into an argument. Tilkey decided to leave the apartment. When he stepped out onto the enclosed patio to collect his cooler, Mann locked the door behind him. Tilkey banged on the door to regain entry, and Mann called police. Tilkey was arrested and pled guilty to a disorderly conduct charge only, and other charges were dropped. After Tilkey completed a domestic nonviolence diversion program, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed as well.

Before the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, Tilkey's company of 30 years, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), terminated his employment based on his arrest for a domestic violence offense and his participation in the diversion program. Allstate informed Tilkey it was discharging him for threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to another person. Following the termination, Allstate reported its reason for the termination on a Form U5, filed with Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and accessible to any firm that hires licensed broker-dealers like Tilkey. Tilkey sued Allstate for wrongful termination and compelled self-published defamation.

The jury returned a verdict in Tilkey's favor on all causes of action and awarded him $2,663,137 in compensatory damages and $15,978,822 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals concluded that compelled self-published defamation is a viable theory, and substantial evidence supported the verdict that the statement was not substantially true. The court did, however, remand the matter for recalculation of the punitive damages award.

FACTS

On August 31, 2014, Mann sent an e-mail to Tilkey at work mentioning the charges that had been filed against him. A field compliance employee later discovered this e-mail while conducting a routine compliance review and forwarded it to Human Resources (HR). HR professional Tera Alferos conducted the initial investigation, and she interviewed Tilkey. She noted Tilkey had been asked to accept a plea deal to have two of the three charges dropped, then the last one dismissed. She never spoke with Mann or interviewed the arresting officers. She also did not investigate Mann's background or review her social media accounts.

A couple weeks later, Alferos sent her supervisor a summary of her investigation, which stated that the police report had been reviewed and noted Tilkey had been charged with but not convicted of a crime. The summary also explained there was no FINRA reporting obligation because there were no felony charges, and it concluded there had been no violation of company policy.

A supervisor then changed the conclusion to state Tilkey's behavior may have been at a level that caused the company to lose confidence in him. At the supervisor’s request, Alferos next added references to the domestic violence charge because it suggested Tilkey had engaged in behavior that could be construed as acts of physical harm or violence toward another person, in violation of company policy. In an e-mail referencing the decision to terminate Tilkey's employment, a Ms. Metzger wrote that they were amending the reason for terminating Tilkey to be "violence against another person whether employed by Allstate or not. "It identified the policy violation as "[t]hreats or acts of physical harm or violence to the property or assets of the Company, or to any person, regardless of whether he/she is employed by Allstate." When the company terminated his employment, it informed Tilkey, "Your employment is being terminated as a result of engaging in behaviors that are in violation of Company Policy. Specifically, engaging in threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to any person, regardless of whether he/she is employed by Allstate."

The company then filed a Form U5 with FINRA reporting its reason for terminating him as follows: "Termination of employment by parent property and casualty insurance company after allegations of engaging in behaviors that are in violation of company policy, specifically, engaging in threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to any person, regardless of whether he/she is employed by Allstate. Not securities related."

Tilkey sued Allstate asserting three causes of action: (1) violation of California section 432.7; (2) wrongful termination based on noncompliance with section 432.7; and (3) compelled self-published defamation to prospective employers. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict for Tilkey and awarded $2,663,137 in compensatory damages, with $960,222 for wrongful termination and $1,702,915 for defamation, and $15,978,822 in punitive damages. Allstate moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Allstate appealed.

I: WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Allstate argued it did not violate the California wrongful termination statue (432.7) when it used as a factor in its termination decision Tilkey's arrest and subsequent conditional plea and entry into a diversion program. Tilkey countered that the company's reliance on his arrest records violated section 432.7; thus, he was wrongfully terminated. The parties' disagreement hinged on the interpretation of section 432.7, subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits employers from utilizing as a factor in employment decisions any record of arrest or detention that did not result in conviction or any record regarding referral to or participation in any pretrial or post trial diversion program.

Allstate argued a conditional plea agreement qualifies as a conviction. Tilkey contended he never entered a guilty plea; thus, there was no conviction. The court concluded we conclude the term "conviction" as defined in section 432.7 does not require entry of judgment: “The plain language here makes clear that a judgment is not required because the conviction can exist without respect to sentencing. (See ibid.) The statute's legislative history supports this interpretation.” A conviction under section 432.7 does not require an entry of judgment; it simply requires entry of a guilty plea. Thus, Allstate did not violate section 432.7 by using Tilkey's arrest as a factor in its decision to terminate his employment.

II: DEFAMATION

Allstate next challenged the defamation verdict, contending that self-compelled defamation should not provide a basis for a defamation per se cause of action. It further contended there was no evidence that Tilkey's self-publication was compelled by its publication of the reason for his employment termination on the Form U5 because that publication contained a privileged statement. Finally, Allstate maintained that its statement was substantially true, justifying reversal of the verdict.

For a valid defamation claim, the general rule is that "the publication must be done by the defendant." (Live Oak Publishing Co. v. Cohagan (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1284 (Live Oak Publishing).) But there is an exception "when it [is] foreseeable that the defendant's act would result in [a plaintiff's] publication to a third person." For the exception to apply, the defamed party must operate under a strong compulsion to republish the defamatory statement, and the circumstances creating the compulsion must be known to the originator of the statement at the time he or she makes it to the defamed individual.

Compelled Self-Published Defamation Per Se

In an action for defamation per se, the meaning is so clear from the face of the statement that the damages can be presumed. The originator of the statement is liable for the foreseeable repetition because of the causal link between the originator and the presumed damage to the plaintiff's reputation but the publication must be foreseeable.  The presumed injury is no less damaging because the plaintiff was compelled to make the statement instead of the employer making it directly to the third party. Allstate offered several other arguments for why the Court should not accept a theory of compelled self-published defamation.

Form U5 Privilege

Allstate provided a written explanation for Tilkey's termination of employment on the Form U5 to FINRA, which was available to every prospective employer of similarly licensed employees. Thus, disclosure was not absolutely privileged. Thus, Tilkey was compelled to explain the reason for his discharge, and this repetition was reasonably foreseeable.

Additionally, the qualified privilege that attaches to communications about an employee's job performance when made without malice or abuse to a third party likewise protects an employer against compelled self-published defamation. This conditional privilege helps protect the free flow of reference information.

Firms are required to file a Form U5 with FINRA whenever a registered representative leaves the firm. If the registered representative's employment has been terminated, the form asks the firm to provide a reason for termination. When the Form U5 identifies allegations of improper conduct by a broker-dealer, an issue that FINRA may need to investigate, it can on those occasions be considered "a communication made 'in anticipation of an action or other official proceeding.' (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th [1106,] 1115.)" (Fontani v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 719, 732, disapproved of on other grounds in Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192.) In those instances, the information reported on the Form U5 would be protected by the absolute privilege outlined in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), at least in California.

Section 7 of the Form U5, however,  includes a list of disclosure questions for full terminations that asks if the terminated employee was the subject of a governmental investigation; was under internal review for fraud, wrongful taking of property, or violated investment related laws, regulations, or industry standards relating to compliance; was convicted of or pled guilty to a felony; or was convicted of or pled guilty to a misdemeanor that related to investments, fraud, false statements, bribery, perjury, forgery, counterfeiting, extortion, or wrongful taking of property. These questions make clear that FINRA seeks termination information that allows it to assess whether the employee's conduct lacked compliance with regulatory requirements in the securities arena. FINRA does not ask for information about non-securities-related activities because that information falls outside its scope of regulation.

Thus, according to the California Court, the absolute privilege extends to communications required by FINRA, i.e., fraud- and securities-related information. However, the communication of Tilkey's termination here did not regard improper securities-related conduct, and Allstate did not limit its responses to fraud- and securities-related information. Instead, Allstate explained Tilkey's departure was the result of a "termination of employment by parent property and casualty insurance company after allegations of engaging in behavior that are in violation of company policy, specifically, engaging in threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to any person, regardless of whether he/she is employed by Allstate. Not securities related." This statement did not contain allegations of improper securities conduct, theft, or allegations or charges of fraud or dishonesty. It was not offered in anticipation of or to initiate an investigation; nor was it offered in the course of any other official 29 proceeding. (See Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) Thus, the absolute privilege does not apply[1].

Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury Findings That Tilkey Was Compelled to Self-Publish a Statement That Was Not Substantially True

The jury concluded that Tilkey was under strong pressure to communicate Allstate's defamatory statement to another person. There was ample evidence to support this conclusion. A “vocational evaluator” testified Tilkey would have a difficult time ever getting another job because he had been terminated, and the reason for termination reported on the Form U5 was negative. He also noted that because Tilkey sold life insurance, he was required to hold securities licenses, and agencies and employers hiring those with securities licenses would have access to U5 forms. Tilkey's supervisor at Allstate, testified that Allstate routinely reviewed the securities public information from the Form U5 of any person they were hiring, and he could not recall ever hiring anyone at Allstate whose Form U5 stated he was terminated for cause. Tilkey testified that when he recruited agents, he would have someone check the Form U5, and he never hired anyone whose Form U5 showed the termination was for cause. He also never received an interview from any company that had access to a Form U5, even though he had 30 years of experience and performed well, receiving the third largest bonus in the state just a few weeks before his termination. Even if the company never offered any specific information about the reason for Tilkey's discharge from employment to prospective employers, its statement at the time of discharge and its reporting of the information on the publicly available Form U5 necessitated Tilkey's self-publication in other settings. In sum, the Court of Appeals upheld the defamation verdict but concluded that the punitive damage award was excessive. More on that later.

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[1] Had Allstate instead eliminated the specifics in its statement, privilege may have attached because Allstate was required to report the termination. For example, it could have supplied the following statement: "Termination of employment by parent property and casualty insurance company after allegations of engaging behavior that are in violation of company policy. Not securities related."

BROKER TERMINATIONS

Are you a financial adviser who has been terminated unfairly?  Well, if you are, you are not alone.  The attorneys at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC have represented advisers all over the country who have fallen prey to a system very unique to the financial services industry – the internet publication of involuntary termination justifications via the Form U-5.  And while the regulators thought this system would be a good thing for investors, it has proven to be a devastating system for many innocent advisers.  We refer to it as “the weaponization of the U-5.”

You will not obtain a new position with a Broker-Dealer or hybrid until your U-5 is filed.  And you probably will not get hired if it contains a negative narrative or one of the answers to question #7 (a) – (f) is marked in the affirmative.  Nor will your home state or FINRA register you until they are done investigating the purported reasons for termination.  If you are in this horrible situation, call us for help today.

FINANCIAL ADVISER TERMINATIONS

It’s what we do here at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC.

              Believe it or not, there are instances in which a broker-dealer seeks out pre-textual reasons for a termination.  Some reasons are more frivolous than others.  For many advisers, an involuntary termination is nothing more than the first chapter of a multi-chapter nightmare.

            The broker-dealer has 30 days from the date of termination to file the U-5, a disclosure to FINRA that modifies the adviser’s U-4 with information regarding the termination.  The U-5 disclosure includes both narratives and the checking of “yes” or “no” boxes.  Notably, which boxes are checked or not will impact what, if any, information is added to the publicly accessible BrokerCheck Report.

            Once the U-5 is filed, and sometimes before that, FINRA and state regulators will make inquiry as to the disclosure.  Before that, however, potential employers will want to know what is, or will be, on the U-5.  During this early post-termination window, while the adviser is trying to get hired and registered, it is common for the former broker-dealer’s agents to solicit the departing adviser’s clients.  Sadly, these solicitations frequently cross the line between fair competition and tortious interference/defamation.

            It should be obvious from this brief summary that it is critical to retain counsel as soon as you begin to even sense that things are going south with your current broker-dealer.  Sometimes the legal department of the broker-dealer will step in and correct its clients’ improper behavior.  Moreover, there are times when the U-5 language initially intended can be modified to be, while still accurate, less prejudicial or inflammatory in nature.  If all else fails, filing an arbitration claim for compensatory and punitive damages and an expungement is a final avenue of recourse.  Please do not try to navigate these treacherous waters by yourself.

The attorneys of Cosgrove Law Group, LLC represent investment advisors, brokers, and other associated persons nationwide in securities employment and regulatory matters, including U-5 defamation matters. Our attorneys also practice in a variety of other areas of law.  If you have a legal matter or concern, please give us a call and speak directly with one of our experienced professionals.

Arbitration Panel Finds Merrill Lynch Defamed Former Employee

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a brokerage firm registered with Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and investment adviser firm registered with Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), as well as Merrill Lynch International Finance, Inc. (collectively, the “firms”), have been ordered by an Arbitration Panel to pay former employee, Miguel Andres Ballestas, $750,000.00 in compensatory damages based upon the firms having been found liable for defamation on FINRA Form U5 relating to the circumstances of Ballestas’ termination. (FINRA Office of Dispute Resolution Arbitration Award No. 14-01946, April 30, 2018).

According to the Arbitration Award, the firms brought an arbitration against Ballestas alleging unjust enrichment and breach of contract, contending that Ballestas failed to pay a promissory note executed on January 9, 2009. Ballestas counterclaimed, alleging that the firms, inter alia: breached duties of good fair and fair dealing; violated FINRA Rule 2010; wrongfully terminated Ballestas; breached fiduciary and contractual duties owed to Ballestas; and committed Central Registration Depository (“CRD”) Form U5 defamation pertaining to Ballestas’ termination from the firms.

In the “Termination Disclosure” section of the Form U5, the firms were apparently asked if Ballestas voluntarily resigned from the firms, or had been discharged or permitted to resign from the firms, after allegations were made that accused Ballestas of: (1) violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or industry standards of conduct; and/or (2) fraud or the wrongful taking of property. Evidently, those questions were answered by the firms in the affirmative.

The Arbitration Award revealed that the firms collectively sought: $407,451.40, which reflected the outstanding promissory note balance, as well as interest, costs and attorneys’ fees; and for Ballestas’ counterclaim to be completely dismissed. However, Ballestas sought a total of $26,000,000.00 in damages from the firms based upon the loss of Ballestas’ book of business, pension, and deferred compensation, and for having suffered from mental pain and anguish by the firms. Moreover, Ballestas sought for his promissory note to be cancelled or at least offset by service payments pertaining to his employment with those firms, and for his CRD Form U5 to be expunged. Evidently, on June 27, 2017, FINRA Office of Dispute Resolution was provided a notice of settlement regarding a portion of the claims made by the firms and Ballestas against each other.

After having considered the evidence, testimony and pleadings, the Arbitration Panel concluded that the firms were jointly and severally liable for CRD Form U5 defamation of Ballestas, and ordered the firms to pay Ballestas $750,000.00 in compensatory damages. Further, the Arbitration Panel recommended that the firms’ answers in the “Termination Disclosure” section of Form U5 be changed to “No” based on the firm’s initial responses being of a defamatory nature.

Cosgrove Law Group, LLC has represented former employees in several U5 defamation cases nationwide, helping them obtain settlements and awards ranging from $100,000.00 to $3,500,000.00. If you feel that you have been a victim to U5 defamation, call Cosgrove Law Group and speak to our experienced counsel today.

Even General Counsels Get Defamed

What happens when the media re-states bluntly what you tried to say cleverly? A jury might find you liable for defamation, even if your statement was made in a legal document.

This observation is one of many take-aways from the litigation victory achieved by Minnesota attorney Chet Taylor. A jury awarded Chet $600,000 for a defamatory statement his former broker-dealer made in a corrective action plan attached to a FINRA consent order. The defendant added another $250,000 after the initial verdict to end the case.

Would a broker-dealer really throw former employees, including its General Counsel, under the proverbial bus? Perhaps. In this instance, broker-dealer Feltl and Company implied in the corrective action plan with FINRA that the “replacement” of certain employees, including its General Counsel, would “enhance a culture of compliance at the firm.” The Wall Street Journal subsequently published an article about Feltl utilizing a direct summary of the rather ham-handed plan: “The firm also said it replaced its general counsel...to beef up compliance.” The jury obviously did not care that Chet was not identified by name in the corrective action plan or Journal article. But they certainly cared that Chet had voluntarily departed for private practice about 2 years before the execution of the Consent Order and plan. Food for thought.

David Cosgrove has obtained monetary awards and expungements for various members of the financial industry from broker-dealers such as U.S. Bancorp Investments, Raymond James Financial Advisers, and Questar. He has also achieved negotiated confidential resolutions on behalf of other advisers and employees.

How to Terminate, Discredit, and Interfere with a Financial Adviser: the U-5

I did not design the method I am about to share with you. Nor do I condone it. But I have observed its employment repeatedly during my legal representation of financial advisers. And although some of the players on the field participate unwittingly, there is always a motivating participant. So, this is how it often works:

1. A FINRA broker-dealer needs a sacrificial lamb (or two) to satisfy a regulator, or a manager or large producer has an ax to grind, or a large producer is seeking to leave with a substantial piece of the broker-dealer's overall assets, or Compliance is too lazy to ferret out a false accusation against a financial adviser.
2. The motivating participant employs Compliance to (unwittingly?) establish an alternative pre-textual basis for termination. Sometimes it is a sales or management practice that has been accepted or overlooked for years.
3. The motivating participant and Compliance employ Legal and Registration, under cover of the attorney-client privilege, to approve and issue a sufficiently disabling Form U-5 disclosure¹. Extra damage can be done by simply checking any of the “yes” boxes under U-5 question 7. This can be too-easily justified by expanding the scope of the term “industry standards” in question 7E. 7E will trigger a public disclosure and regulatory investigation.
4. Delay #1: The broker-dealer has 30 days after the termination to file the Form U-5. It can also update it at any time should updates be necessary.
5. Delay #2: State regulators will refuse to register the financial adviser until they can investigate the basis for the U-5 disclosure. They may take weeks or months to inquire of the financial adviser and broker-dealer, giving the unmotivated broker-dealer 30-60 days to respond to their request for information. Often times this lengthy response time is used by the broker-dealer to craft a letter that is misleading and refers to the financial adviser in the worst possible light. A copy is not sent to the financial adviser.
6. Delay #3: FINRA will likely demand documents and explanations as well from all of the parties.
7. During the pendancy of #'s 3, 4, and 5, the broker-dealer may aggressively enforce non-solicitation or non-compete provisions. The successor financial adviser will call the departing financial adviser's book and, among several tactics, claim that he/she does not have contact information for the departed financial adviser. He or she may also encourage the client to view any disclosures on BrokerCheck and to stay with the current broker-dealer².
8. Finally, a promissory note balance may be used to exert extra financial pressure or silence from the financial adviser.

This is the basic anatomy of a tortious scheme to interfere with a financial adviser's business relationships. If you are currently or about to be a part of this game, either as a victim or hesitant participant, I urge you to contact me³ immediately.

1Most U-5 disclosures, however, are free of defamatory content or tortious intent. In other words, most broker-dealers satisfy their obligation to ensure a full, fair, and accurate reporting.

2This is a critical footnote. One or more of the players may simply be mean-spirited or incompetent. While this person may be the motivating player, he or she is usually manipulated and used by the motivator. The ultimate financial adviser victim—typically our client—frequently has a character defect (like all of us) that is exaggerated and exploited.

3David Cosgrove has handled U-5 matters involving MetLife Securities, US Bancorp Investments, Questar, US Allianz, Edward Jones, Raymond James, Morgan Stanley, ING Financial partners, and others.    

Business Torts in the Financial Industry Arena

The attorneys at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC frequently handle business disputes on a contingent fee basis in arbitrations and the courts.  We are typically litigating in the financial industry arena where slashing, cross-checking and full-body blows are routine. Although they may be routine, they may also cross a generous line and sow the seeds for a future arbitration award or court judgment.

When an investor, broker-dealer agent or investment adviser representative comes to us for help, our first task is to gather all of the facts. This is, of course, a critical task. But the next step is just as critical – identifying the most applicable and powerful causes of action. The cause of action is your gateway from facts to recovery, and the evidentiary elements of and recovery available under different causes of action vary greatly. Luckily, you don’t have to choose just one. For example, an investor may have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that does not provide for punitive damages in an arbitration forum, but he or she may also have a claim for a violation of a state’s model security act. That act explicitly provides for punitive damages, costs and/or attorney fees under certain provisions. As such, an arbitration panel would be empowered to grant those remedies.

Another example: a broker may have a U-5 defamation claim against his former broker-dealer.  If she signed a financial adviser agreement that has a Missouri choice-of-law provision (because that is where her broker-dealer is headquartered), but her broker-dealer defamed her to her clients in Georgia as well, the broker likely has a Missouri breach of contract cause of action and Georgia common law tort claims for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship. So, if you are a member of the financial industry arena or an investor, and you just took an illegal cross-check, make sure you hire the right legal counsel, and do so as soon as possible.

Defamation v. Tortious Interference

Most of us have at least a “street-level” understanding of defamation. Individuals that hear or read damaging false statements about themselves or their business typically think: “I need to find a defamation lawyer.” They may be right. But if the defamatory statements at issue intersect with a commercial relationship or transaction, there is another avenue of relief and compensation that should be considered.

There are times when defamatory statements are intended to interfere with an existing business relationship. Take for example the case of investment adviser representative and broker Norm Meyer. He retained a fine lawyer, other than this firm, to go to war with his former broker-dealer¹. Norm may have had some issues if he, or his lawyer, restricted their thinking to defamation. First and foremost, defamation claims typically have to be brought within one year. Other causes of action, such as breach of contract and tortious interference have much longer life-spans.

After a very long legal battle, Norm has his BrokerCheck (professional record) amended. The arbitration panel ordered a uniquely thorough Form U-5 expungement and a detailed amendment.

One more observation: defamatory statements, even in the commercial context, frequently get repeated in the media. One example is a business journal. Whether or not the media is liable for repeating the defamatory statements of another depends upon the facts and forum at play. A careful analysis of what was said and in what context is critical in determining whether or not the media should be added as defendants, if litigation is the path you must follow. 

Keep an eye on this blog to learn more about defamation, tortious interference, and reputation damage management and compensation.

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1 We represented Norm's colleague in the same matter.

Defamation Reputation Damage Management

In 1378, the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum granted judges and church officials in England a legal right to compensation if they had been insulted or defamed. The first Common Law defamation action on record was filed in England in 1507. Back then, however, the cause of action only applied to false utterances regarding criminality, incompetence, and disease. The law evolved dramatically in the United States. Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Stewart once wrote that the tort of defamation “reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.¹”

Defamation law has been somewhat static since the seminal Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964. But consider what has changed in the 50 years since that ruling. Let me cite just a few examples of developments that have completely transformed the impact of damages caused by defamatory conduct:

1. An erosion of society's perception of what is a private matter;
2. 24-hour news cycles;
3. The relative decline of more thorough print media; and
4. The internet (and the explosion of linked high-speed outlets for the dissemination of falsehoods.)

As the old saying goes, “A lie makes its way around the world before the truth has time to get its pants on.”

I will blog again shortly about the intersection of defamation and U-5 FINRA defamation claims. The lesson for now is as follows: brokers that have suffered from U-5 defamation need to do much more than simply file an arbitration claim. Reputation management is critical.

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1 If you want to dig deeper in to the legal history of defamation law, start with David Hudson's excellent piece by clicking here.

Federal District Court Denies Questar's Motion to Vacate 3.25 Million Dollar Arbitration Award

On November 12, 2012, Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell of The United States District Court, WesternDistrict of Kentucky, issued a 60-page Opinion denying a Petition to Vacate and a Motion to Vacate filed by Questar Capital Corporation. Questar is a fully owned subsidiary of U.A. Allianz. Questar filed in federal court after a 3-arbitrator FINRA panel sitting in Louisville issued a $3.25 million Award to a client of St. Louis' Cosgrove Law Group, LLC. The client is a former independent contractor, broker-dealer agent, and investment advisor representative of Questar.

The Court spent the first 1/3 of its Opinion addressing the broker's contention that Questar had waived its right to file a Motion to Vacate by failing to comply with the 30-day post-Award deadline set forth in FINRA Rule 13904. The broker had filed a Motion to Dismiss Questar's Petition to Vacate because, while it was filed within 30 days of the Panel's Award, Questar subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate about 75 days after the Award. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, concluding that, despite conflicting legal precedent, Rule 13904 “did not establish a 30-day time limit for filing a Motion to Vacate.” (Opinion at 23). Specifically, Judge Russell concluded that it is sufficient if a movant files within the 90-day time limit set forth in Section 12 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Approximately half-way through his meticulous Opinion, Judge Russell initiated his analysis of “the heart of this proceeding”--the merits of Questar's application for vacatur. He began by noting the limited grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated under the FAA, noting that the Sixth Circuit recognizes an extra non-FAA judicial basis-- “manifest disregard of the law” by the arbitrator. Finally, rather than proceeding to evaluate sequentially each and every specific claim set forth by Questar, the Court divided Questar's allegations and the Court's analysis into the four FAA grounds of vacatur, as well as the Sixth Circuit's manifest disregard basis.

As to FAA Section 10(a)(2)-- “evident partiality” --the Court concluded that Questar's challenge to the sufficiency of pre-hearing disclosures the Panel Chairman made was without merit. (Opinion at 29-39). The Court's detailed analysis in this regard notes, among other things, that “...a party cannot remain silent as to perceived or actual partiality or bias and then later object after the panel reaches an unfavorable decision.” (Opinion at 37).

Judge Russell proceeded on to address Questar's multi-layered contention that the Panel violated FAA Section 10(a)(3) in that it allegedly refused to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy. In this regard the Court noted that “the standard for judicial review of arbitration procedures is merely whether a party to arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair proceeding.” (Opinion at 40). The Court observed that only two of Questar's myriad of claims fell within this category: 1) that despite allowing the broker to introduce evidence through the testimony of his former attorney, the Panel improperly allowed him to assert the attorney-client privilege on Questar's cross-examination, and 2) that the Panel improperly excluded testimony from the broker's former clients. (Opinion at 41-42).

As to the first, the Court concluded that the claim was factually without merit. As to the latter, the Court concluded that the Panel's provision of 10 subpoenas in response to Questar's request for 55 subpoenas in the middle of the five-months of hearing sessions was more than adequate, noting that “arbitrators are not required to hear all of the evidence tendered by the parties; they need only afford each party a fair opportunity to present their arguments and evidence.” (Opinion at 42-49).

As to FAA Section 10(1)(4), the Court evaluated Questar's general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support Claimant’s claims for defamation, negligence or tortious interference. At the outset of this analysis, the Court noted:

“...the award is devoid of any rationale or explanation as to the factual basis for the Panel's decision, the particular theory or cause of action upon which the award is based, and/or how the Panel calculated the award figure. But, Importantly, this is precisely the outcome contracted for between the parties. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (“Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give reasons for an award.”); Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6^th Cir. 2000) (“Arbitrators are not required to explain their decisions.”). As the Sixth Circuit has stressed, where the arbitral agreement imposes no duty of explanation on the arbitrator, “remand for the purpose of having the arbitrator clarify his reasoning would be inappropriate.” Id. at 977 n.9.

(Opinion at 50-51).

Aptly enough, Judge Russell stated: “The Court will not be lured into reviewing the merits of the Panel's decision.” (Opinion at 51). The Court proceeded to rebuke Questar's sufficiency challenge after a careful review of the appropriate controlling precedent and standard of review for Motions to Vacate. Judge Russell cited a fundamental tenet on this point:

“The Supreme Court and this Circuit have both admonished courts that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract [to arbitrate] and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed a serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision”; accordingly, “courts must refrain from reversing an arbitrator simply because the court disagrees with the result or believes the arbitrator made a serious legal or factual error.” Misco, 484 U.S. At 38; Salvay, 442 F.3d at 476.

(Opinion at 56).

Finally, the Court evaluated Questar's Motion to Vacate under the Sixth Circuit's “manifest disregard of the law” standard. This analysis bore no fruit for Questar either. Judge Russell cited Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW L.L.C., 300 F.App'x 415 (6^th Cir. 2008) for the proposition that vacatur is only appropriate under this standard if “the decision [flies] in the face of clearly established precedent.” Id. at 418. (Opinion at 57). The Court also made the insightful distinction between a manifest disregard of the law, and the manifest disregard of fact that Questar was essentially peddling. (Opinion at 58-59).

The attorneys at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC spent approximately five (5) months briefing the various post-Award issues in this matter. In doing so, they reviewed dozens upon dozens of FAA and vacatur opinions. Judge Russell's Opinion in this matter may be the most thorough and instructive. You would be remiss not to digest it and save it if you practice in this area.

The Privilege Defense to U-5 Defamation Claims

Cosgrove Law previously blogged on the topic of U-5 defamation. We noted that broker-dealers that are members of the FINRA are required to file a Form U-5 when terminating their relationship with a registered representative.  Broker-dealers must also describe the specific reason(s) that the rep was discharged or permitted to resign.  If the reasons disclosed on the U-5 were false, exaggerated or misleading, the firm can be subject to a claim for defamation.

One defense frequently raised by defendant broker-dealers is that the statements made on the form U-5 are subject to an "absolute privilege."  This means that a broker-dealer cannot be held liable for defamation for anything it puts on the U-5, even if it knows the statements were false or misleading.  If that defense is unavailable, a broker-dealer will argue that the statements are subject to a "qualified privilege."  A qualified privilege is usually revoked by proof of malice or by a showing of reckless disregard as to the truth of the statements.  Frequently, the falsity of the statements could arguably show the malice required to revoke whatever privilege the U–5 might enjoy.

Unfortunately for the broker-dealers raising the absolute privilege defense, it is rarely available.  State law, not federal law, determines whether an absolute privilege applies.  So far, only the state of New York has adopted the absolute privilege standard.  Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007) (finding that statements made by employer on form U-5 are subject to absolute privilege in suit for defamation).

In fact, many states have explicitly rejected the absolute privilege defense or have found that only the qualified privilege applies. See Dawson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that reports of customer complaints on Form U-5 are not protected by absolute privilege under Illinois law); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 136-37 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that statements on Form U-5 are not entitled to absolute privilege under Tennessee law); Moreland v. Perkins, Smart & Boyd  240 P.3d 601, 609 (Kan.App. 2010) (rejecting absolute privilege and holding that the statements in the Form U–5 were entitled to a qualified privilege at most, both under case law and under Kansas statutory law); Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.  431 F.Supp.2d 247, 261-62 (D.Conn. 2006) (finding that statements made on form U-5 were not subject to absolute privilege from defamation liability under Connecticut law, but were instead subject to qualified privilege); Boxdorfer v. Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, No. 1:09-cv-0109-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 2448459, *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 10, 2009) (noting that statements on the Form U-5 are entitled to a qualified privilege under Indiana law); Wietecha v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., No. CIV 05-0324-PHX-SMM,  2006 WL 2772838, *11 (D.Ariz. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding that Arizona law comports with the application of a qualified privilege to statements published in the U-4 and U-5 Forms).

If you are a registered representative and feel you have been harmed by false or misleading statements published on your Form U-5 or to third parties, Cosgrove Law, LLC has substantive experience representing reps and advisers in such matters. 

Recent FINRA Awards for Defamatory Statements on Form U-5’s

In the last few years, broker-dealers have seen a recent trend by its regulatory authority, FINRA, in cracking down on the high standard of accuracy and fairness that brokerage-dealers must adhere to in terminating registered representatives.

Broker-dealers that are members of the FINRA are required to file a Form U-5 when terminating their relationship with a registered representative.  Broker-dealers must also describe the specific reason(s) that the rep was discharged or permitted to resign.  Publishing the reasons or causes for a rep’s discharge or resignation can be troubling if the reasons disclosed on the U-5 were false, exaggerated or misleading. 

A black mark on one’s U-5 can make it extremely difficult, and in some cases, impossible, to find another job in the industry.  Therefore, the potential damages against the broker-dealer for defamatory statements on one’s U-5 can be exponential, especially if the false statements were intentionally or recklessly published.  In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, the statements on the U-5 can be ordered to be expunged and amended to reflect the truth.

In July 2011, a Philadelphia FINRA Panel awarded Gregory Kipple, a former broker of Wells Fargo, $6.83 million for wrongful termination and defamation ($4.3 million for lost earnings; $1 million for defamation; $1 million in punitive damages for violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act; and $530,000 in cost and attorney’s fees).  Wells Fargo was also ordered to update Kipple’s U-5 to reflect that he was “terminated without cause.”  Kipple was fired in August of 2009 for his “failure to follow the firm’s policies related to ‘know your customers.’”  However, Kipple had no direct involvement or interaction with the specific customer that the statement was in reference to. 

The District Court upheld another FINRA award against Wells Fargo in July 2011 for submitting defamatory statements on a discharged employee’s form U-5.  The claimant, Kenneth Schafer alleged that infractions reported on his U-5 were misleading and pretextual because he was discharged for health reasons.  Schafer was awarded $75,000 in compensatory damages. 

In June of 2011, a FINRA Arbitration Panel awarded a Claimant with a substantial punitive damage award.  In Olsen v. World Equity Group, Olsen alleged defamation, breach of contract, and tortious interference.  Claimant Olson alleged that Respondent WEG had breached its employment contract with him, wrongfully terminated him, and maliciously defamed him on his Form U5.  Olson was awarded $285,000 in compensatory damages, $575,000 in punitive damages, and $282,800 in attorney’s fees.  The Panel also ordered expungement of the defamatory comment from his U-5 which stated, “Disagreement over advertising policy, rules, and advertising protocol.”  The statement was to be replaced with, “FINRA Arbitration Panel ruled discharge was wrongfully administered. FINRA Arbitration Panel questions the appearance of the stated internal review and/or its effectiveness. FINRA Arbitration Panel found no violations of investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or industry standards of conduct.” 

In Perales v. Chase Investment Services Corp., also decided in June 2011, the claimant sought damages for defamation and expungement of the statements on her U-5 which alleged that she committed fraud and wrongfully took property. Chase was ordered to pay Perales $75,000 in compensatory damages and FINRA ordered expungement of the defamatory statements and recommended replacement language. 

Charles Schwab was punished in 2010 with a substantial punitive damage award by a FINRA Panel.  In that case, Claimant Timothy Leahy, who was a registered representative with Charles Schwab, was awarded $1.8 million in total damages, of which $1.5 million was comprised of punitive damages, as well as expungement of the defamatory statement from his U-5.  Leahy’s U-5 stated that he was terminated for “failure to adhere to HR related policies.”  The Panel found that Schwab conducted an inefficient human resources investigation, stated false violations as reasons for his termination, and found that Schwab had the “specific intent” to harm the Leahy. 

In 2009, FINRA found that Questar Capital Corporation included misleading information on John Saldutte’s U-5 after terminating him as a registered rep.  Saldutte was awarded $68,000 in compensatory damages and the Panel ordered expungement of the information contained on his U-5 regarding his termination and recommended Questar replace the defamatory statement with the following language: “After conducting a deficient investigation, the firm wrongfully terminated representative based on erroneous, misleading, and unjustified conclusion that representative knowingly participated in unregistered person’s submission of business in representative’s name.”     

If you’re a registered representative and feel you have been harmed by false or misleading statements published on your Form U-5 or to third parties, Cosgrove Law, LLC has substantive experience representing reps and advisers in such matters.