Sunday, November 30, 2014

What Will be on the SEC’s 2015 Exam Priorities for Investment Advisers?

Each January, The SEC’s National Exam Program (“NEP”) issues examination priorities for the year ahead.  The priorities are based upon the SEC’s evaluation of those areas in the financial markets that it believes will be presenting a risk of harm to investors, the markets, or capital formation.

The NEP has four program areas: 1) Investments advisers, 2) broker-dealers, 3) exchanges and SRO’s, and 4) clearing and transfer agents.  Recall that the SEC and State regulators split the regulatory oversight for investment advisers with the SEC retaining jurisdiction over the “larger AUM” RIA’s.

The 2014 NEP priorities for investment adviser agents and registered investment advisers included safety of assets and custody and conflicts of interest and marketing claims related to investment objective and performance.  In the opinion of this author, one would think Fisher Investments endured a substantial SEC exam in 2014 in light of these priorities. The SEC is already foreshadowing what will be included in the list for 2015.

Hearsay and rumors in our corner of the market indicate that the SEC is currently concerned about investment adviser sales practices related to 401(k) to IRA rollovers.  If it is indeed a 2015 priority, there will certainly be several large RIA’s under the microscope.  Of no surprise, word on the street is that the priority list will include cyber security and dual registrations.  As for the broker-dealer area: it looks like costly mutual funds and “bad brokers” will be an SEC priority for 2015.   But enough speculation – we should have the list in a matter of weeks.  In the meantime, let us know if we can help you with your compliance or litigation needs.  Food for thought.


Business Torts in the Financial Industry Arena

The attorneys at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC frequently handle business disputes on a contingent fee basis in arbitrations and the courts.  We are typically litigating in the financial industry arena where slashing, cross-checking and full-body blows are routine. Although they may be routine, they may also cross a generous line and sow the seeds for a future arbitration award or court judgment.

When an investor, broker-dealer agent or investment adviser representative comes to us for help, our first task is to gather all of the facts. This is, of course, a critical task. But the next step is just as critical – identifying the most applicable and powerful causes of action. The cause of action is your gateway from facts to recovery, and the evidentiary elements of and recovery available under different causes of action vary greatly. Luckily, you don’t have to choose just one. For example, an investor may have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that does not provide for punitive damages in an arbitration forum, but he or she may also have a claim for a violation of a state’s model security act. That act explicitly provides for punitive damages, costs and/or attorney fees under certain provisions. As such, an arbitration panel would be empowered to grant those remedies.


Another example: a broker may have a U-5 defamation claim against his former broker-dealer.  If she signed a financial adviser agreement that has a Missouri choice-of-law provision (because that is where her broker-dealer is headquartered), but her broker-dealer defamed her to her clients in Georgia as well, the broker likely has a Missouri breach of contract cause of action and Georgia common law tort claims for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship. So, if you are a member of the financial industry arena or an investor, and you just took an illegal cross-check, make sure you hire the right legal counsel, and do so as soon as possible.

Saturday, September 6, 2014

New FINRA Rule Limits usage of Expungement Requests in Arbitration


The SEC has approved FINRA Rule 2081 that would disallow brokers from conditioning settlement of a customer dispute on a customer’s consent to the broker’s request for expungment from the Central Registration Depository (“CRD”). The CRD is the licensing and registration system used by all registered securities professionals. The system enables public access to information regarding the administrative and disciplinary history of registered personnel, including customer complaints, arbitration claims, court filings, criminal matters and any related judgments or awards. Because of the open nature of information available to its investors, registered professionals would like sensitive matters, such as customer complaints, expunged from the record. 

The purpose of Rule 2081 is to make sure that full and reliable customer dispute data remains available to the public, brokerage firms, and regulators to prevent concealment by prohibiting the use of expungement as a bargaining chip to settle disputes with a customer. Furthermore, it allows regulators to make informed licensing decisions about brokers and dealers and improve FINRA’s transparency on broker-dealer complaint histories. This prohibition applies to both written and oral agreements and to agreements entered into during the course of settlement negotiations, as well as to any agreements entered into separate from such negotiations. The rule also precludes such agreements even if the customer offers not to oppose expungement as part of negotiating a settlement agreement and applies to any settlements involving customer disputes, not only to those related to arbitration claims.

On one hand, Rule 2018 will make it more difficult for brokers to sanitize their CRD report from a past claim, ensuring that future investors can more accurately assess the quality and integrity of a registered securities professional, ensuring protection from potential fraud and abuse.  On the other hand, settlements are a significant part of resolving FINRA claims in a timely manner.  If more FINRA claims reached arbitration, then the average FINRA claim would take substantially longer to adjudicate.  Ultimately, Rule 2081 could dissuade broker-dealers from settlement prior to arbitration because they may want to take their chances in arbitration, making an already potentially slow moving process, slower.

When investigating historical use of expungement in arbitration, pursuant to SEC Release No. 34-72649, the SEC found “despite the very narrow permissible grounds and procedural protections designed to assure expungement is an extraordinary remedy…, arbitrators appear to grant expungement relief in a very high percentage of settled cases.” In order to even seek expungement, FINRA Rule 2080 requires a showing that (1) the claim, allegation or information is factually impossible or clearly erroneous; (2) the registered person was not involved in the alleged investment-related sales practice violation, forgery, theft, misappropriation or conversion of funds; or (3) the claim, allegation or information is false. 

In approving Rule 2081, however, the SEC cautioned FINRA that the new rule should not be the last word on the subject of expungement and that FINRA should continue to consider making improvements to the expungement process. In this regard, even though “the proposed rule change is a constructive step to help assure that the expungement of customer dispute information is an extraordinary remedy that is permitted only in the appropriate narrow circumstances contemplated by FINRA rules,” the SEC nonetheless remains concerned about “the high number of cases where arbitrators grant brokers’ expungement requests.” SEC Release No. 34-72649


Official rule language:


2081. Prohibited Conditions Relating to Expungement of Customer Dispute Information.

"No member or associated person shall condition or seek to condition settlement of a dispute with a customer on, or to otherwise compensate the customer for, the customer’s agreement to consent to, or not to oppose, the member’s or associated person’s request to expunge such customer dispute information from the CRD system. See Regulatory Notice 14-31."

Cosgrove Law Group, LLC has experience with financial industry disputes including representing investors in recouping their losses and registered representatives seeking expungement. We also provide training, information, and compliance for registered professionals through the Investment Adviser Rep Syndicate.

Authored by Mercedes Hansen

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Does your Investment Adviser Firm Have a Social Media Policy?

Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, or blogs have become popular mechanisms for companies to communicate with the public. Social media allows companies to communicate with clients and prospective clients, market their services, educate the public about their products, and recruit employees. Social media converts a static medium, such as a website, where viewers passively receive content, into a medium where users actively create content. However, this type of interaction poses certain risks for investment advisers and this topic has been a hot button for securities regulators. 

The SEC previously issued a National Examination Risk Alert on investment adviser use of social media. As a registered investment adviser, use of social media by a firm and/or related persons of a firm must comply with applicable provisions of the federal securities laws, including the laws and regulations under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”). The Risk Alert noted that the various laws and regulations most affected by social media are anti-fraud provision, including advertising, compliance provisions, and recordkeeping provisions. Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7 requires firms to create and implement social media policies, and periodically review the policy’s effectiveness. 

Anti-fraud provisions with respect to advertising are probably most affected by the use of social media. All social media use and communications must comply with Rule 206(4)-1. While advertising policies should already be included in a firm’s compliance manual, such policies may not be sufficient enough to address some of the concerns with advertising in the context of social media. Establishing a specific policy to address social media may be prudent.

The area of advertising that has caused the most confusion is the prohibition on the use of testimonials. The SEC has previously defined testimonial to include a statement of a client’s experience with, or endorsement of, any investment adviser. Firms and IARs must ensure that third-party comments on their social media sites do not constitute a testimonial. Furthermore, the SEC vaguely discussed whether the popular “like” function on many social media sites would be deemed a testimonial:

[T]he staff believes that, depending on the facts and circumstances, the use of “social plug-ins” such as the “like” button could be a testimonial under the Advisers Act. Third-party use of the “like” feature on an investment adviser’s social media site could be deemed to be a testimonial if it is an explicit or implicit statement of a client's or clients' experience with an investment adviser or IAR. If, for example, the public is invited to “like” an IAR’s biography posted on a social media site, that election could be viewed as a type of testimonial prohibited by rule 206(4)-1(a)(1).

The types of policies that firms must create concerning advertising and testimonials depend greatly on the function of a specific website. For instance, approving the firm or IARs use of certain websites may turn on whether that website allows for review and approval of third-party comments before such comments are posted on the site or whether the “like” function can be disabled. A firm’s monitoring capabilities and the latitude it wants to provide employees with respect to personal use of social media cannot be ignored either.

The SEC has outlined various factors that should be considered by an investment adviser when evaluating the effective of their compliance program. These factors are:
  • Usage and content guidelines and restrictions on IAR use of social media whether on behalf of the firm or for personal use
  • Mechanisms for approval of social media use and content;
  • Monitoring of social media use by the firm and IARs and the frequency of monitoring;
  • Consideration of the function or risk exposure of specific social media sites;
  • Establishing training and requiring IAR certification;
  • Whether access to social media poses information security risks; and
  • Firm resources that can be dedicated to implementation of social media policies.
There are various considerations firms must take into account when establishing social media policies or evaluating the effectiveness of its existing policies. If your firm needs assistance, the Cosgrove Law Group, LLC can assist with creation or review of such policies.

Friday, August 1, 2014

Who has the Right to Enforce Your Promissory Note?

A customary practice in the securities industry is for financial advisors to receive a transition bonus above and beyond an advisor’s standard commission compensation upon joining to a new firm. The bonus amount is usually determined using a certain percentage or multiplier of the advisor’s trailing 12-month production. These are usually referred to as “promissory notes” or Employee Forgivable Loans (“EFL”). Promissory notes are often used to solicit new employees/contractors from another brokerage firm. However, this “incentive” is usually cloaked with many restrictions. Typically these loans are forgiven by the firm on a monthly or annual basis but the advisor has to commit to the firm for a specified number of years or be required to pay the balance back to the firm should the advisor leave before the end of the term. 

Brokerage firms can enforce promissory notes through FINRA arbitration. Promissory note cases are one of the most common types of arbitration and the brokerage firms experience a high success rate with these cases. These proceedings are governed, in part, by FINRA Rule 13806 if the only claim brought by the Member is breach of the promissory note. This rule allows the appointment of one public arbitrator unless the broker rep. files a counterclaim requesting monetary damages in an amount greater than $100,000.  If the “associated person” does not file an answer, simplified discovery procedures apply and the single arbitrator would render an Award based on the pleadings and other materials submitted by the parties. However, normal discovery procedures would apply if the broker rep. does file an answer. Thus, if a broker wants to make use of common defenses to promissory note cases and obtain full discovery on these issues, the broker should ensure that he or she timely files an Answer.    
  
A recent trend with promissory notes is that the advisor’s employer does not actually own the Note. Sometimes this entity holding the note upon default is a non-FINRA member company, such as a subsidiary of the broker-dealer or holding company set up specifically to hold promissory notes. Many believe the practice of dumping promissory notes into a subsidiary is to circumvent the SEC requirement that brokerage firms hold a significant amount of capital (one dollar for each dollar lent) to protect against loan losses.  By segregating promissory notes into a separate entity, firms likely can retain much less to meet its capital requirements. 

Because a non-FINRA member firm may ultimately attempt to enforce the promissory note, questions arise as to how an entity can use FINRA arbitration to pursue claims against an agent.  The Note likely contains a FINRA arbitration clause but this may create questions of the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Furthermore, non-FINRA member entities cannot take advantage of FINRA’s expedited proceedings for promissory notes under Rule 13806 as this rule only applies to “a member's claim that an associated person failed to pay money owed on a promissory note.”

However, in order to make use of the simplified proceedings under Rule 13806, some member-firms have started a practice of sending a demand letter to the broker requesting full payment be made to the broker-dealer, rather that the entity that actually owns the note.  Broker-dealers have also attempted to simply add the Note-holder as a party to the 13806 proceedings. Reps should immediately question the broker-dealer’s standing to pursue collection or arbitration, the use of Rule 13806 to govern the arbitration, and potentially consider raising a challenge to a non-FINRA member firm attempting to enforce its right through FINRA arbitration. 


If you have recently received a demand letter seeking collection of a promissory note or are party to an arbitration, you may wish contact the attorneys at Cosgrove Law Group, LLC for legal representation.

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Calculating Breach of Fiduciary Duty Damages

According to a variety of authorities including the SEC, the much-debated fiduciary duty for registered investment advisers and their representatives includes a subset of responsibilities[1].  Common sense would, or should tell you that the appropriate damage calculation for a breach of fiduciary duty will be directly dependent upon and vary according to the particular unfulfilled responsibility.  For example, a breach of the fiduciary duty regarding conflicts of interest or honesty, as opposed to mere suitability, will call for out-of-pocket damage compensation if these breaches occurred before any market-losses at issue.  Even in a suitability only arbitration, however, expert witnesses may debate the applicability of out-of-pocket loss calculations as opposed to model portfolio based market-adjusted damage calculations.

It is common in breach of fiduciary duty cases involving trustees to award damages in the amount necessary to make the beneficiary whole. Restatement of Trusts, Second, § 2205, (1957), provides that proof of harm from a breach of fiduciary duty entitles an injured party to whom the duty was owed to damages that: (a) place the injured party in the same position it would have been in but for the fiduciary breach;(b) place the non-breaching party in the position the party was in before the breach; and (c) equal any profit the breaching fiduciary made as a result of committing the breach. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979) (“One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.”).
Delaware law is consistent with this principle. In Hogg v. Walker, 622 A.2d 648, 653 (Del. 1993), the court noted that “where it is necessary to make the successful plaintiff whole” for a breach of fiduciary duty, courts have been willing to allow the plaintiff to recover a portion of trust property or its proceeds along with a money judgment for the remainder. The court in Hogg stated that “[i]t is an established principle of law in Delaware that a surcharge is properly imposed to compensate the trust beneficiaries for monetary losses due to a trustee’s lack of care in the performance of his or her fiduciary duties.” Id. at 654.[2]; see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (stating that in measuring damages for breach of fiduciary duty the court has complete power “to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages.”); Harman v. Masoneilan Intern., Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 500 (Del. 1982) (finding that “the relief available in equity for tortious conduct by one standing in a fiduciary relation with another is necessarily broad and flexible.”) (citing See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 874 (1979)).

In O'Malley v. Boris, 742 A.2d 845, 849 (Del. 1999), the court stated that the relationship between a customer and stock broker is that of principal and agent. The court stated a broker must act in the customer’s best interests and must refrain from self-dealing, and that these obligations are at times described “as fiduciary duties of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty.” (emphasis added) Id. The court further found that fiduciary duties of investment advisors “are comparable to the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, and are limited only by the scope of the agency.” Id.   Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 432 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1027 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (finding that reasoning from case addressing breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee was persuasive in case involving investment advisor because, “[l]ike a trustee, an investment advisor may be considered a fiduciary.”).

In sum, it is critical to identify the particular duty at issue in order to arrive at a proper damage calculation.  The broker’s duty of suitability is essentially a limited duty of care akin to the one at play in a negligence matter. The fiduciary duty, however, carries within it an entire penumbra of duties of which portfolio/investment suitability is just one.  If an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is limited to the adviser’s responsibility to recommend or make a suitable investment only, the damage calculations may indeed mirror the broker-dealer damage calculation.  An adviser’s breach of its fiduciary duty beyond the mere standard of investment care, however, requires the finder-of-fact to calculate “make-whole” damages.


[1]Miley v. Openheimer, 637 F.3d 318 (1981) is “the seminal case on damages in a suitability case[.]”
[2] A “surcharge” is relief in the form of monetary compensation for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of duty. The Supreme Court in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011), stated that an ERISA fiduciary can be “surcharged” or ordered to pay money damages under the ERISA provision allowing a participant or beneficiary of the plan to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief.” In making this determination, the court stated that “[t]he surcharge remedy extended to a breach of trust committed by a fiduciary encompassing any violation of a duty imposed upon that fiduciary.” The court went on to conclude that “insofar as an award of make-whole relief is concerned, the fact that the defendant in this case, . . . , is analogous to a trustee makes a critical difference.”

Friday, March 28, 2014

Defamation v. Tortious Interference

Most of us have at least a “street-level” understanding of defamation. Individuals that hear or read damaging false statements about themselves or their business typically think: “I need to find a defamation lawyer.” They may be right. But if the defamatory statements at issue intersect with a commercial relationship or transaction, there is another avenue of relief and compensation that should be considered.
There are times when defamatory statements are intended to interfere with an existing business relationship. Take for example the case of investment adviser representative and broker Norm Meyer. He retained a fine lawyer, other than this firm, to go to war with his former broker-dealer1. Norm may have had some issues if he, or his lawyer, restricted their thinking to defamation. First and foremost, defamation claims typically have to be brought within one year. Other causes of action, such as breach of contract and tortious interference have much longer life-spans.
After a very long legal battle, Norm has his BrokerCheck (professional record) amended. The arbitration panel ordered a uniquely thorough Form U-5 expungement and a detailed amendment.
One more observation: defamatory statements, even in the commercial context, frequently get repeated in the media. One example is a business journal. Whether or not the media is liable for repeating the defamatory statements of another depends upon the facts and forum at play. A careful analysis of what was said and in what context is critical in determining whether or not the media should be added as defendants, if litigation is the path you must follow. 
Keep an eye on this blog to learn more about defamation, tortious interference, and reputation damage management and compensation.
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1 We represented Norm's colleague in the same matter.

Wednesday, March 19, 2014

Defamation Reputation Damage Management

In 1378, the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum granted judges and church officials in England a legal right to compensation if they had been insulted or defamed. The first Common Law defamation action on record was filed in England in 1507. Back then, however, the cause of action only applied to false utterances regarding criminality, incompetence, and disease. The law evolved dramatically in the United States. Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Stewart once wrote that the tort of defamation “reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.1

Defamation law has been somewhat static since the seminal Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964. But consider what has changed in the 50 years since that ruling. Let me cite just a few examples of developments that have completely transformed the impact of damages caused by defamatory conduct:
  1. An erosion of society's perception of what is a private matter;
  2. 24-hour news cycles;
  3. The relative decline of more thorough print media; and
  4. The internet (and the explosion of linked high-speed outlets for the dissemination of falsehoods.)

As the old saying goes, “A lie makes its way around the world before the truth has time to get its pants on.”

I will blog again shortly about the intersection of defamation and U-5 FINRA defamation claims. The lesson for now is as follows: brokers that have suffered from U-5 defamation need to do much more than simply file an arbitration claim. Reputation management is critical.
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1 If you want to dig deeper in to the legal history of defamation law, start with David Hudson's excellent piece by clicking here.

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

Missouri Supreme Court Rejects Trade Secret Claim Over Client List

Troy Kennedy (Kennedy”) left his position as director and executive officer of a trust and investment company when that company was bought by Central Trust & Investment Company (“CTI”). Kennedy left to found a competing firm. Both companies provided financial advice and investment management services. Within six months, Kennedy had successfully solicited 85 former clients.

Before the sale and departure in question, Kennedy had placed a detailed list of 200 clients in a safe deposit box upon the advice of legal counsel. Kennedy did not register his new company, ITI, with the SEC as an investment adviser. Instead, Kennedy affiliated himself as an investment adviser representative of an RIA called SignalPoint Asset Management, LLC (“SignalPoint”), the defendant in this case. The agreement between Kennedy and SignalPoint allowed Kennedy to offer investment services through SignalPoint in exchange for various fees on an independent contractor basis.

CTI filed suit against Kennedy and his new company, ITI. At the time it filed suit, it didn't even know about the client list in the safe deposit box. The suit included causes of action for conspiracy, misappropriation of trade secrets (MUTSA) and tortious interference with business relations. CTI then added SignalPoint as a third defendant. All three defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted SignalPoint's only. The Supreme Court ordered the matter transferred to it from the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court's analysis of the three different claims begins on page 7 of the 2014 Opinion [Click HERE]. The Opinion is a must read for attorneys representing agents or representatives that are about to “change ships” or broker-dealers or RIAs that are taking on a competitor's producer.

The Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of the statutory trade secret claim because CTI could not establish that SignalPoint had access to the client list. In doing so, it side-stepped the issue of whether the client list qualified as a trade secret. Ironically, the most valuable portion of the opinion for practitioners might be the two extensive footnotes (8 and 9) about client lists that prove that lawyers and judges can render obscure what should be obvious. Regardless, the Supreme Court concluded that because there was no access, there was no misappropriation, so there was no MUTSA violation.

The first 10 pages of the opinion fail to pin the law to the reality of the situation—that Kennedy had access to the list and was using it to benefit himself and SignalPoint. Ironically, the plaintiff's attorney couldn't pin that tail on the donkey either—he or she somehow failed to plead any theory of vicarious liability. The theory of respondent superior was not available either—Kennedy's IAR Agreement clearly established him as a non-employee. CTI needed but failed to plead that Kennedy was an agent over whom SignalPoint had a sufficient degree of control.

The Court proceeded to set forth the elements of a claim for tortious interference:

“To prove a claim for tortious interference with a contract or a business expectancy, the plaintiff must prove the following five elements: “(1) a contract or a valid business expectancy; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach of the contract or relationship; (4) absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting from defendant's conduct.”

The Court concluded that the fourth element requires a showing of “improper means” and the plaintiff could not establish any because there was no misappropriation of a trade secret. The civil conspiracy claim died from the same wound. Food for thought.


The Cosgrove Law Group represents individual agents and reps both before and after they make a move to a new B/D or RIA. Retaining counsel before the litigation starts just might help you prevail and prosper.   

Sunday, March 2, 2014

Is your RIA's Code of Ethics Adequate?

Being a fiduciary to clients means acting in the client’s best interest and putting their interest before yours and others. Sometimes knowing what is in the client’s best interest can get foggy so establishing certain guidelines can help protect you, your client, and your representatives. 

In accordance with Rule 204A-1 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, RIA’s registered with the SEC are required to maintain a written code of ethics that outline the fiduciary duties and standards of conduct of the RIA and its representatives. State registered RIA’s may also be required to develop a code of ethics consistent with state regulations. 

It’s important to keep in mind that in creating a code of ethics, the SEC and various state regulations set minimum requirements.  The following items are required in an RIA’s code of ethics under Rule 204A-1:
  • A standard of business conduct which reflects the fiduciary obligations to clients;  
  • Provisions requiring all advisers’ and supervised persons’ compliance with applicable federal securities laws;
  • Protection of material non-public information of both the adviser’s securities recommendations, and client securities holdings and transactions;
  • Periodic reporting and reviewing of access persons’ personal securities transactions and holdings;
  • Advisor’s approval before an access person can invest in an IPO or private placement;
  • Duty to report violations of the code of ethics;
  •  A written acknowledgment that all supervised persons received the code of ethics; and
  • Recordkeeping provisions. 
RIAs often set higher standards that work to reinforce the values or business practices of the company.  Rule 204A-1 does not require detailed measures to be included into every code because of the vast differences among advisory firms.  However, the SEC has offered guidance and recommendations on additional best practices that advisors should consider incorporating into its code of ethics.  The following list contains additional safeguards that are commonly implemented by other advisers:
  • Prior written approval before access persons can place a personal securities transaction (“pre-clearance”);
  • Maintenance of lists of issuers of securities that the advisory firm is analyzing or recommending for client transactions, and prohibitions on personal trading in securities of those issuers;
  • Maintenance of “restricted lists” of issuers about which the advisory firm has inside information, and prohibitions on any trading (personal or for clients) in securities of those issuers; 
  • “Blackout periods” when client securities trades are being placed or recommendations are being made and access persons are not permitted to place personal securities transactions.
  • Reminders that investment opportunities must be offered first to clients before the adviser or its employees may act on them, and procedures to implement this principle.
  • Prohibitions or restrictions on “short-swing” trading and market timing.
  • Requirements to trade only through certain brokers, or limitations on the number of brokerage accounts permitted;
  • Requirements to provide the adviser with duplicate trade confirmations and account statements; and
  • Procedures for assigning new securities analyses to employees whose personal holdings do not present apparent conflicts of interest.
Another issue that may be important to include in your code of ethics is provisions concerning gifts and entertainment since giving or receiving gifts between a client and advisor may create the appearance of impropriety.  Gift and entertainment provisions usually contain reporting requirements and a prohibition of accepting gifts over de minimus values, such as $100.

While the above requirements and recommendations generally encompass an advisor’s fiduciary duty as it relates to conflicts of interests, advisors have additional fiduciary duties to clients that should be memorialized in a code of ethics as well.  For example, and what might appear obvious to some, advisors cannot defraud or engage in manipulative practices with a client in any way.  Advisors also have a duty to have a reasonable, independent basis for the investment advice provided to a client and to ensure that investment advice meets the client’s individual objectives, needs, and circumstances.  Advisors are also expected to stay abreast of market conditions.  Clients should be provided with all material information related to their investments or investment strategy and should be adequately informed of the risks associated with those investments.  The depth of the explanation of those risks or strategy depends on the client’s level education and experience.     

The buck doesn’t stop with establishing a written code of ethics, however.  Implementation and enforcement of your code of ethics are just as crucial.  This also includes educating your representatives.  Rule 204A-1 does not mandate specific training procedures but ensuring that your representatives understand their obligations and their fiduciary duties is imperative.  Thus, periodic training with new and existing employees is not only in your best interest, but also the interest of your employees and clients.  Finally, you should annually review your code of ethics to determine if there are any areas of deficiency or whether changes need to be made.

The Syndicate can assist with your firm in the following ways: (1) drafting or establishing a code of ethics; (2) reviewing your current code to assure it complies with applicable state or federal laws; (3) implementing training programs; and (4) analyzing your firm’s implementation procedures to ensure compliance with the codes provisions.

Friday, February 28, 2014

Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Stanford Fraud Victims’ Ability to Bring State Law Claims  

When I covered Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice during oral arguments in the Supreme Court, I promised I would update you when the High Court rendered its decision.     

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided in a 7-2 decision whether investors in a class action suit were precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) from bringing state law causes of action against law firms and other third party entities for their alleged roles in the $7 billion R. Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme. SLUSA bars certain class action plaintiffs from bringing state law claims based on misrepresentations made “in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”  SLUSA narrowly defines “covered security” as “[a security] listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange” such of which must be listed or authorized to be listed “at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.”

The class action at the center of this case concerned a Ponzi scheme by R. Allen Stanford involving certificates of deposits (“CDs”) sold to investors.  Part of the misrepresentations made to the investors were that the CDs were backed by a portfolio of marketable securities.  Recovery against Stanford has been unsuccessful, with investors receiving about a penny on the dollar for their losses, so the victims brought claims against various third-party entities alleging they made misrepresentations concerning the safety of the investments and that Stanford’s attorneys conspired with and aided and abetted Stanford in violating the securities laws by lying to the SEC and assisting Stanford to evade regulatory oversight.

The central question of the case was whether the purported securities-backed CDs sold to investors qualified the transactions as a covered security.  Plaintiffs argued that since SLUSA specifically exempted CDs from the definition of a covered security, they were not preempted from bringing state law claims.  Defendants, however, argued that since Stanford represented that the CDs were backed by marketable securities, a covered security under SLUSA, plaintiffs were barred from asserting state law claims. 

The test applied by the District Court, used in the Eleventh Circuit, asks “whether a group of plaintiffs premise their claim on either ‘fraud that induced [the plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendants] … or a fraudulent scheme that coincided and depended upon the purchase or sale of securities.’”  Since the District Court determined that the investors were induced to purchase the CDs under the belief that they were backed by marketable securities, it denied plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision, rejecting the test applied in the Eleventh Circuit and instead adopting the Ninth Circuit test: “A misrepresentation is ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a security if there is a relationship in which the fraud and the stock sale coincide or are more than tangentially related.” The Fifth Circuit relied on public policy considerations that requires interpretation of the “in connection with” element in a manner not to preclude group claims simply because the issuer advertises that it owns covered securities in its portfolio.

In upholding the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court relied on several factors.  First, the basic focus of SLUSA seeks to include transactions in covered securities, not upon transactions in uncovered securities.  Second, a natural reading of SLUSA’s language supports the interpretation that a connection between the representation and a sale matters where the misrepresentation makes a significant difference to someone’s decision to purchase or to sell a covered security, not to purchase or to sell an uncovered security.  The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs never alleged the defendants’ misrepresentations led anyone to buy or to sell (or to maintain positions in) covered securities.  Third, the Supreme Court found that prior case law supports its interpretation because every securities case brought before the Court where fraud was “in connection with” a purchase or sale of a security has involved a covered security as defined by SLUSA. 

In its fourth point, the Supreme Court pointed out that their interpretation of SLUSA was consistent with the underlying regulatory statutes: the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933.  The opinion states, “[n]ot only language but also purpose suggests a statutory focus upon transactions involving the statutorily relevant securities” and nothing in those acts or SLUSA provides a reason for interpreting its language more broadly.  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer went on to explain that “to interpret the necessary statutory “connection” more broadly…would interfere with state efforts to provide remedies for victims of ordinary state ­law frauds.”  For instance, the Court noted that a broader interpretation would allow SLUSA to prohibit a lawsuit brought by creditors of a small business that falsely represented it was creditworthy, in part because it owns or intends to own exchange-traded stock.

Finally, the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that the Court’s ruling would significantly curtail the SEC’s enforcement powers, especially since enforcement powers are enumerated in other statutes and the dissent could not point to one example of a federal securities action—public or private—that would now be impermissible under the Court’s decision.   

While the case did not consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, it allows the victims to proceed in their fight to recovery for the billions lost in the Ponzi Scheme. 

*I owe credit to this prompt update to Gerhard Petzall, an attorney here in St. Louis who started his own firm in 1963.  Meeting him for the first time last night at a high school mock trial competition, we sparked up a conversation about securities law and how technology has changed the landscape of our profession and personal lives.  I had extreme admiration for the fact that Gerhard practiced during a time where information was not readily at your fingertips the way it is now.  I couldn't even imagine.  Gerhard read about the Supreme Court decision in the financial section of the newspaper.  I told him that I believed I sat near him for a reason because I had been following this case and had been waiting for the decision to be released.  Had he not mentioned it, I might not have gotten the news right away.  We had a good laugh and I promised him that I would make sure to give him credit when I wrote my article.  Since I keep my promises, thank you Gerhard! 


Thursday, February 20, 2014

Investment Adviser Fiduciary Duty Standard Includes a Duty to Explain Investment Activity

The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates larger investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Act”). In a previous posting, we noted that perhaps the most significant provision of the Act is Section 206, which prohibits advisers from defrauding their clients and which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as imposing on advisers a fiduciary duty to their clients. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (“[T]he Act’s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”).

A number of obligations to clients flow from the fiduciary duty imposed by the Act, including the duty to act in the clients’ best interests, to fully disclose any material conflicts the adviser has with its clients, to seek best execution for client transactions, to provide only suitable investment advice, and to have a reasonable basis for client recommendations. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, SEC Release No. IA-2333; Status of Investment Advisory Programs under the Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC Release No. IA-1623.

From these fiduciary obligations arises the duty to properly explain investments or an investment strategy to clients. Where a financial adviser provides advice about investments, “a fiduciary duty is breached when the client is encouraged to purchase an investment with a level of risk that is not appropriate for the client, or is not properly informed of the speculative nature of an investment.” Sakai v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., C-06-2581 MMC, 2008 WL 4193058 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2008) (citing Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460-61 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that broker had fiduciary duty to fully inform client of nature and risks of selling short, “in terms capable of being understood by someone of [client’s] education and experience.”)).

 “A fiduciary must provide a proper disclosure and explanation of the investment activity, and should warn a client to exercise caution if an investment presents a greater risk than tolerable, given the client’s goals and circumstances.” Id.; see also Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that where adviser assisted clients in establishing speculative option trading account, “[a] more studied opinion of the risks of option trading in light of the [clients’] then-existing investment objective was owed by [the adviser] to [his clients]. This he failed to do, in breach of his fiduciary duty.”); In re Old Naples Sec., Inc., 343 B.R. 310, 324 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (stating that “failing to disclose and fully explain the risk of an investment to an investor can be a breach of the broker’s fiduciary duty.”); Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 737 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Colo. 1987) (“A broker who becomes a fiduciary of his client must act with utmost good faith, reasonable care, and loyalty concerning the customer’s account, and owes a duty . . . to keep the customer informed as to each completed transaction, and to explain forthrightly the practical impact and potential risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged.”).

A good example of the application of the fiduciary duty to explain comes from Faron v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996).  Although this case involves a broker-dealer as opposed to an investment adviser, Missouri imposes an unambiguous fiduciary standard on broker-dealers.  In Faron, the client approached a registered representative of the broker-dealer inquiring whether he could obtain money from a trust to purchase a new home. He asked whether it would “cost any money.” Id. at 510. After he consulted with the registered representative he felt assured he could get the money and the transaction would result in no cost to him. He did not specifically consider tax ramifications nor did he directly ask about tax consequences. He assumed Waddell & Reed was lending the money to him to use, at no cost. However, instead of a loan the transaction actually consisted of a redemption of mutual funds. Id. He obtained the $250,000 from Waddell & Reed, returning the same amount within the required 21 days. The client’s accountant discovered the tax liability in the amount of approximately $32,000 while preparing an income tax return. The accountant brought it to the attention of the client, who brought suit against Waddell & Reed.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Waddell & Reed, finding that Waddell & Reed had no duty to provide tax information because none was requested.  On appeal, the court noted:

In Missouri, stockbrokers owe customers a fiduciary duty. This fiduciary duty includes at least these obligations: to manage the account as dictated by the customer's needs and objectives, to inform of risks in particular investments, to refrain from self-dealing, to follow order instructions, to disclose any self-interest, to stay abreast of market changes, and to explain strategies. Implicit in these obligations is a duty to disclose to the customer material facts.
 Id. at 511 (emphasis added).

The court of appeals found that Waddell & Reed was privy to information and had expertise not yet proven on summary judgment to be equally or reasonably available to the client. In particular, the registered representative was aware of details of the transaction which consisted of a redemption of mutual funds, while the clients understood the transaction to amount to a short-term loan. Id. Waddell & Reed had a duty to manage the account according to the client’s expressed needs and objectives, to bridge finance by use of trust assets with “no loss whatsoever,” if possible, or to inform the client of the costs. Id. The client communicated his concerns about possible costs associated with the proposed transaction to the registered representative. The client was not told how the transaction would occur but was told it would not cost any money. The court of appeals concluded that what was meant by “costs” in the discussions between the parties remained uncertain. This implicated an unresolved question of fact, making summary judgment for Waddell & Reed inappropriate. Id.

In sum, the fiduciary duty standard requires that the client be properly informed of the nature of an investment or investment strategy. What is necessary in order to meet this standard will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A more in depth explanation of the risks of an investment or investment strategy will be necessary where the client’s related education and experience is minimal. Similarly, a more detailed explanation of strategy will become necessary where the strategy being implemented is more speculative in nature. Whether the fiduciary duty to explain has been met will usually be a question of fact to be decided by the judge, jury, or arbitrator after hearing all of the evidence.

Friday, February 14, 2014

David Cosgrove Interviews the Chair of NASAA'a Investment Adviser Section

Earlier this month, David Cosgrove of Cosgrove Law Group and The Investment Adviser Rep Syndicate interviewed Ms. Patricia Struck, Chair-Person of the Investment Advisor Section for the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and the Administrator of the Division of Securities of the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions.  The interview, relevant to state and SEC registered Investment Adviser Representatives and Registered Investment Advisers is posted below. 


David Cosgrove:    Let's start with the basics - What is NASAA?

Patricia Struck:   The North American Securities Administrators Association is oldest international organization devoted to investor protection. It’s a voluntary association whose membership consists of 67 state, provincial, and territorial securities administrators in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Canada, and Mexico.

DC:                 For how long have you been the administrator of the Wisconsin Division of Securities?

PS:                   I’ve been the administrator since 1995.

DC:                 What advisers do the states regulate as opposed to the SEC?

PS:                   Generally, the states regulate “small” (with assets up to $25 million) and “mid-sized” (with assets up to $100 million) advisers.  Of the 28,366 advisers currently on IARD, more than 17,000 are state advisers. The rest of the universe – nearly 11,000 advisers – are SEC advisers.

DC:                 It is my understanding that NASAA has different "working groups". Is there a working group focused on the advisory as opposed to the broker industry?

PS:                   NASAA has “sections” divided into 5 subject matter areas; one of the five is the investment adviser section and another is the broker-dealer section. But while the sections are separate on paper, they work very closely together – especially the investment adviser and broker-dealer section.

DC:                 For how long have you been the head of NASAA's Investment Advisor Section?
           
PS:                   I just became chair of the section in October of 2013. This is my third term as chair.

DC:                 Can you give me some examples of some of the positions held by the folks in this section?  What exactly does this section seek to accomplish and how does it go about meeting those goals?

PS:             The section includes nearly 50 volunteers from across the US and Canada with vast expertise in the whole range of regulatory issues relating to investment advisers. Some are the administrators in their jurisdictions. Some are registration chiefs or lead examiners in their states. Many are examiners who perform exams in advisers’ offices. All have specific subject matter expertise in issues 

DC:                       As you know, the Investment Adviser Rep. Syndicate focuses on the training, compliance, and business goals of the representative rather than the RIA. What observations did you make in 2013 that would be of interest to advisory representatives? 

PS:             In 2013, as state securities regulators assumed the increased regulatory oversight of investment advisers managing under $100 million in assets, NASAA released an updated series of recommended best practices that investment advisers should consider to minimize the risk of regulatory violations. These recommendations were based on the sample data reported by examiners in 44 state and provincial securities agencies between January and June 2013. The 1,130 reported examinations uncovered 6,482 deficiencies in 20 compliance areas, compared to 3,543 deficiencies in 13 compliance areas identified in a similar 2011 examination of 825 investment advisers.
As regulators, we are concerned about investor confusion stemming from the blurred lines between traditional brokerage, investment advisory, and financial planning services; partially because of the expectations the brokerage industry has set, and partially because of the marketing approach the industry uses – the proverbial ‘financial adviser’ who is your partner in retirement every step of the way. As long as the broker-dealer industry continues to engage in advice driven marketing the confusion will persist. That’s one reason why state securities regulators have long advocated that broker-dealers must be held to the fiduciary duty standard of care currently applicable to investment advisers and be required to place retail investor interests ahead of their own.

DC:                       What are the section's goals for 2014? 

PS:             The section always strives to look for ways to enhance uniformity in investment adviser firm and investment adviser representative registration practices. We also will continue our ongoing efforts to support states in conducting investment adviser exams. And of course, we will review our existing “best practices” for IA firms to consider while developing their own compliance programs and evaluate whether additional practice areas are necessary.

DC:                       How is the migration of RIA's pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act going? 

PS:             The IA Switch, involving the transfer of more than 2,100 investment advisers from federal to state oversight, was one of the most significant achievements in the history of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).
The Switch stemmed from Section 410 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), which raised the assets under management (AUM) threshold for state regulation of investment advisers from $25 million to $100 million. 
This report documents the work that went into the successful completion of the Switch.

DC:                       If there were three things you would like to see the Syndicate accomplish what would they be?  

PS:             1. Helping IARs have a better understanding of the role of their state regulator
2. Helping to create an ongoing dialogue between the IAR and regulatory communities
3. Helping IARs appreciate investor confusion stemming from the blurred lines between traditional brokerage, investment advisory, and financial planning services – and work to cut through that confusion

DC:                       What is the one thing you would be grateful to see investment adviser representatives take away from this interview?

PS:                   I would like them to appreciate that we are their partners in putting investors first. State       securities regulators are accessible, both to investors and to the people we regulate. We work closely with     the IAR communities in our states and appreciate the value and importance of communication. We share       the same goal of providing the best level of service to investors. We’re in this together. 

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Missouri House Bill 1480 Seeks to Create Whistleblower Program under the Missouri Securities Act

Missouri House Representative Steven Weber is sponsoring House Bill 1480 (“HB 1480”) which proposes to amend the Missouri Securities Act to include provisions that establish a whistleblower program. 

HB 1480 defines whistleblower as a person who, under the whistleblower program, discloses information regarding a violation or potential violation of securities law or a rule adopted or order issued under securities laws.  The whistleblower must be employed by or associated with the following: (1) a broker dealer; (2) an issuer; or (3) a person that receives compensation for advising others of the value of securities or the advisability of investing, purchasing, or selling securities or issues or promulgates analyses or reports relating to securities as a regular part of their business. 

Since many whistleblower programs would not be as effective without the promise of anonymity, HB 1480 permits the Commissioner of Securities to collaborate with the Attorney General or other appropriate prosecuting attorney to implement procedures to ensure the confidentiality of the whistleblower.  However, the actual language of the bill states, “The ‘Whistleblower Program’ is created to receive information or records from whistleblowers and, in the discretion of the Commissioner, to maintain the confidentiality of whistleblowers.”  Thus, while it appears that maintaining the confidentiality of a whistleblower is a goal of the program, it is not guaranteed.   

In line with the notion that the identities of whistleblowers should remain anonymous, records maintained by the Commissioner as a part of the program are not public records unless the Commissioner finds that disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.  The records can also be disclosed through the legal process if they are subject to a subpoena or court order.     

The Bill would also provide whistleblowers with a cause of action against an employer for retaliation if adverse action is taken against the employee for participation in the whistleblower program.  Whistleblowers are afforded one year to bring such claims and can request the following relief: (1) reinstatement to their position without loss of seniority; (2) back pay; (3) punitive damages; and (d) costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  However, whistleblowers are prevented from obtaining relief if their employer proves the employee participated in the violation, was criminally convicted for the violation, or the action is clearly frivolous or vexatious. 

Whistleblower programs also exist for federal violations of securities law.  In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities Act of 1934 to add a section titled, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” Under this program, individuals who voluntarily provide the SEC with original information that leads to successful enforcement actions resulting in monetary sanction over $1,000,000 may be eligible to receive an award from 10 – 30% of the monies collected by the SEC.  The program also prohibits retaliation from employers. 

In January, the SEC issued its 2013 report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program.  The report noted that Fiscal Year 2013 was historic for the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower (“OWB”), paying $14,831,965 to whistleblowers whose information contributed to the success of enforcement actions.  Of the 3,238 tips received in 2013, 17.2% concerned corporate disclosures and financials, 17.1% concerned offering fraud, and 16.2% concerned manipulation, with the most over-all tips coming from California, New York, Florida, and Texas.  Missouri ranked 26th on the number of reported tips with only 31.  Whistleblower submissions were also received from individuals from fifty-five foreign countries.   

Since the program’s creation, six individuals have received awards, four of them occurring in 2013.  The report also indicates that the program paid its largest award of over $14 million to one whistleblower whose information led to the recovery of substantial investor funds.  Thus, the awards given to the other three individuals in 2013 were much less substantial.   

Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Program prompted Utah to pass a similar Act in 2011 that also allows for payment to a whistleblower for voluntarily providing information that leads to the successful enforcement of a judicial or administrative action. 

Unlike Dodd-Frank’s or Utah’s Whistleblower Programs, the HB 1480 doesn’t provide for any payment for information that assists in the prosecution of securities violations.  Should this bill pass, the likelihood of the program’s success remains to be seen since there is no financial incentive to report potential wrongdoings, the anonymity of the whistleblower doesn’t appear to be guaranteed, and Missouri residents are less active in submitting tips under Dodd-Frank’s program.    


Currently, HB 1480 has been introduced and referred to the Missouri House Financial Institutions Committee.  We will keep you updated on the Bill’s progress.   

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Illinois Securities Department Requests Hearing against Springfield Investment Adviser Rep for Alleged Fraud

On January 17, 2014, the Illinois Securities Department filed a Notice of Hearing against investment adviser representative, David Matthew Lisnek.  As of November 13, 2013, the Department suspended Lisnek’s registration and further prohibited him from offering or selling any securities or otherwise engaging in the business of rendering investment advice in the State of Illinois. Lisnek was registered as an LPL salesperson and an investment adviser representative since September 23, 2004 but was terminated from LPL when the State of Illinois suspended Lisnek’s registration.  Lisnek has also been charged with one count of Financial Exploitation of the Elderly – a class 1 felony.    
 
The Notice alleges that Lisnek engaged in fraud involving at least three clients who are either elderly or nearing retirement.  The alleged loss is $270,918 in client funds.  The Notice also alleges that Lisnek held himself out as “an expert in investments and retirement planning and authored multiple books and articles advising the public, including advice on how to avoid getting defrauded by your financial adviser…”  The purported fraud committed by Lisnek is detailed as follows.    

Lisnek allegedly approached an 84 year old client (“PC’) with an investment opportunity to provide funds to another customer of Lisnek’s (so that the customer could renovate her home) in exchange for the customer’s REIT stocks.  LPL specifically prohibits a rep’s involvement with any cross transactions between clients.   Despite LPL’s policy, between June and September of 2013, Lisnek instructed PC to write him eleven checks totaling $65,000.  Lisnek either deposited the checks into a personal account or cashed them rather than purchasing REIT stock on behalf of PC.  The Notice alleges that Linsek used the $65,000 for his own benefit.  After further investigation, it was discovered that in 2011, Lisnek advised the client to purchase other REIT stock at over 2.5 times its actual value.    

The second client in which Lisnek is purported to have defrauded is a 54 year old client (“RJ”).  Around 2010 and 2011 Lisnek advised RJ to purchase real property for $272,500 if he allowed Lisnek and his family to reside there.  Lisnek promised to purchase the residence from RJ a year and a day later for $321,550.  In the interim, Lisnek agreed to pay RJ $2,000 in monthly rent.  Lisnek apparently advised RJ to withdraw the funds to purchase the property from an annuity Lisnek sold him the year prior.  RJ incurred approximately $17,418.29 in surrender charges from the early withdrawal.  To date, Lisnek has never made any of the monthly rent payments or purchased the property from RJ as agreed. 

In December 2010, Lisnek also advised RJ to invest in Lisnek’s own publishing company whose only purported asset was the copyrights to a book written by Lisnek.  RJ invested $50,000 in the publishing company pursuant to the terms of a buy-sell agreement which Lisnek never abided by.  It was later discovered that the publishing company was not a legal entity and Lisnek’s book had no registered copyright.

Around 2010-2011, Lisnek approached RJ with an opportunity to loan $40,000 to another client of Lisnek’s.  The Notice states the client, who is referred to as AB, was 69 years old.  Around January 31, 2011, Lisnek drafted a Promissory Note between RJ and AB whereby RJ agreed to provide AB with a loan of $40,000 and that AB would repay RJ the principal plus $5,000 by May 31, 2011.  Lisnek advised AB to write the $45,000 check to Lisnek and that he would deposit the check into RJ’s account.  However, Lisnek only deposited $30,000 in RJ’s account and deposited the remaining $15,000 into Lisnek’s personal account.

From 2012 through 2013, Lisnek also convinced AB to write him nine checks totaling $80,000.  Lisnek purportedly gave AB two checks totaling $115,000 in payment for the loans but instructed her not to cash the checks.

The lesson to investors here, which may seem obvious to some, is never write a personal check to your financial advisor under any circumstance.  Entering into investment “opportunities” that involve your advisor is also extremely questionable and we recommend avoiding those types of transactions.      


Lisnek’s hearing is currently set for February 19, 2014 so stay tuned for updates relating to this matter.